Exploring the Relationship Between Profit-Squeeze and Occupational Safety and Health Violations by Schell, Natalie Marie
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Title of Thesis: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROFIT-
SQUEEZE AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
VIOLATIONS 
 
 
Natalie Marie Schell, Master of Arts, 2005 
 
 
Thesis Directed By: Professor Sally Simpson 
 Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
 
One challenge for corporate crime scholars has been to distinguish criminal firms 
from non-criminal firms.  A common explanation for this distinction is that offending 
companies are more economically troubled than firms that offend less or not at all.  This 
study examines the relationship between firm characteristics and crime by focusing on 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations.  Specifically, this 
research applies a profit-squeeze explanation to account for OSHA violations using a 
cross-sectional analysis of 77 companies for the time period 1993-2000.  Results indicate 
mixed support for the profit-squeeze argument at the firm level using a variety of 
financial performance measures.  Analyses also reveal that union membership was related 
to OSHA violations.   
 
  
 
EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROFIT-SQUEEZE AND 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATIONS 
 
 
by 
 
Natalie Marie Schell 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts 
2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advisory Committee: 
 Professor Sally Simpson Chair/Advisor 
 Professor Shawn Bushway 
 Professor Gary LaFree 
 
 Table of Contents 
 
Section          Page 
 
List of Tables          ii 
 
Chapter I Introduction        1 
 
Chapter II Review of the Literature       7 
 Theoretical Background       7 
 Empirical Support        10 
 Occupational Safety and Health Administration Overview   18 
 Industry Overviews        23 
 Hypotheses         32 
 
Chapter III Sample and Methodology      36 
 Sample         36 
 Dependent Variables        37 
 Independent Variables       39 
 Statistical Procedure        44 
 
Chapter IV Results and Discussion       46 
 Bivariate Results        46 
 TOBIT Results        49 
 
Chapter V Discussion and Conclusion      65 
 
References          73 
 ii
 List of Tables 
 
Number         Page
 
1.  OSHA Violation Types       21 
 
2.  Average Rates of Violations per Inspection by Industry, 1993-2000 25 
 
3.  Manufacturer’s Value Added by Industry by Year   27 
 
4.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by Industry from 1993-2000  29 
 
5.  Rate of Injuries and Illnesses by Industry from 1993-2000  31 
 
6.  Industry Characteristics       32 
 
7.  Chronological Distribution of Inspections, Violations  
     and Rate of Violations       38 
 
8.  Descriptives of Variables, Averaged for Years 1993-2000  43 
 
9.  Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 48 
 
10.  TOBIT Analysis, 1993-2000      50 
 
11.  TOBIT Analysis, 1993-1996      57 
 
12.  TOBIT Analysis, 1997-2000      61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
While some studies have shown corporate crime to be a pervasive problem 
(Sutherland, 1983, Clinard & Yeager, 1980, Simpson, 1986), others have reported that 
not all corporations engage regularly in illegal behavior and a few even go beyond “mere 
compliance” with rules, setting higher standards of behavior (Harrington, 1988, Cohen, 
1998, Arora & Cason, 2001, King & Lenox, 2000).  Thus, a challenge for corporate 
crime scholars has been to determine whether those corporations that regularly engage in 
illegal behavior are distinguishable from those that do not.  One of the main predictions 
produced in response to this question is that companies in financial distress are more 
likely to commit illegal acts (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975, Asch & Seneca, 1976, Singh, 
1986, Simpson, 1986, Keane, 1993).  
This hypothesis of a relationship between financial performance and illegal 
behavior is based on the fact that organizational goals affect managerial decisions.  
Prevailing corporate values and beliefs in a corporation become institutionalized and 
define legitimate goals for employees to pursue (Vaughan, 1998).  The over-arching goal 
of all corporations is profit; companies are profit-seeking organizations and in order to 
survive, they must make money.  In fact, some have argued that the only responsibility of 
a business is to its shareholders and that a corporation’s social responsibility is to make a 
profit (Griffin & Mahon, 1997).  In corporations where organizational values emphasize 
profit as the main goal, they create a great deal of pressure to maintain profitability no 
matter what means are used.  Thus, when a company is experiencing financial decline, 
there is pressure to increase profits and reduce costs, even in ways that may be illegal.  
For example, a firm with declining profits might engage in price-fixing in order to 
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 increase profits or alternately might ignore Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration or Environmental Protection Agency regulations in order to reduce costs 
(Hill et al., 1992).  
Despite the common-sense attraction of this prediction, empirical evidence has 
been mixed.  While some studies find support for the relationship between poor financial 
performance and crime (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975, Clinard & Yeager, 1980, Simpson, 
1986), others have failed to support this hypothesized relationship (Hill et al., 1992).  In 
fact, some research finds the opposite prediction to be the case, that firms with moderate 
or very good financial performance are more likely to commit illegal acts (Baucus and 
Near, 1991).  A somewhat more consistent finding is that industry profitability and 
characteristics are related to corporate crime (Simpson, 2002, Clinard & Yeager, 1980, 
Keane, 1993).  Such discrepant results may be due to the type of offending under 
consideration.  One limitation of previous empirical tests of profit-squeeze at the firm 
level and crime is that it has been conducted largely using organizations convicted of 
antitrust violations (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975, Asch & Seneca, 1976, Simpson, 1986, 
Simpson, 1987). 1  Less attention has been paid to other types of violations (See Clinard 
& Yeager, 1980 for an exception).  It is important to examine a variety of offense types to 
determine whether the profit-squeeze crime relationship holds for all types of corporate 
crime or just for certain illegal organizational behaviors as has been suggested by some 
(Hill et al., 1992, Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  More recent studies have begun to widen 
the scope of violations investigated to include environmental, discrimination, and safety 
                                                 
1 Antitrust violations include a wide-range of behaviors aimed at creating a competitive advantage, such as 
price-fixing, price discrimination, illegal mergers, tying agreements, unfair advertising, warranty, and 
patent violations (Simpson, 1986).   
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 and health violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996, Hill et al, 1992, Baucus & Near, 1991, 
Jenkins & Braithwaite, 1993).   
In this paper, I add to the studies that have widened the scope of violations by 
investigating the relationship between firm and industry profitability and Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violation.  Thus far, three studies have 
reported on this relationship.  McKendall et al. (2002) included a control variable for 
financial performance in their analysis of the effects of ethical compliance on OSHA 
violations and reported it as the only significant control in their study showing that 
declining profits were related to more violations.  Alexander and Cohen (1996) examined 
companies convicted of federal crimes, including some convicted for violations of safety 
regulations, and found some support for the profit-squeeze argument.  Finally, Hill et al. 
(1992) found no support for the profit-squeeze argument in their study of OSHA and 
EPA administration violations.  
A problem associated with studies that use OSHA data, such as those discussed 
above is that, like official data reported by the police, it is difficult to disentangle whether 
the data are picking up the behavior patterns of criminals or the behavior patterns of the 
enforcement agency.  Thus, I attempt to improve on previous studies that have examined 
the profit-squeeze argument using OSHA data by controlling for the inspection behaviors 
of OSHA.  Drawing from the body of literature that has examined the effectiveness of 
OSHA inspections, I gathered data to control for OSHA inspection behavior.  A unique 
aspect of OSHA is that workers have the power to influence OSHA enforcement.  All 
employees may initiate an OSHA inspection by filing a complaint and an even greater 
ability to influence the outcome of the inspection by accompanying the inspector 
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 throughout the inspection process.  Unionized employees have been shown to take 
advantage of these rights more than nonunionized employees (Weil, 1991 & Weil, 1996).  
Further, other studies have shown that unions lobby OSHA to inspect nonunion firms 
more heavily.  In their study, Bartel and Thomas (1985) found that OSHA inspected 
nonunion firms more heavily resulting in higher costs for competitors who were not 
union members.  Regardless of whether OSHA inspects unionized or nonunionized firms 
more heavily, controlling for union membership should parcel out some of the inspection 
behavior of OSHA.2  
I also include a measure for prior violations in my analysis, which no other 
studies investigating the profit-squeeze and crime relationship using OSHA violations 
have done.  Prior violations have been a fairly consistent predictor of future illegal acts in 
the corporate crime literature (Sutherland, 1983, Baucus & Near, 1991, Simpson & 
Koper, 1997) and the larger criminological literature (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, 
Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2001, Agnew, 1991).  Further, Finney and Lesieur (1982) suggest 
that past violations have a powerful impact on criminal decision-making within firms.  
Firms with a history of illegal behavior may become committed to illegal activities 
because of complications and dependencies created by earlier violations.  This, in turn, 
can lead to a development of a corporate culture that supports illegal behavior, which 
leads to repeated violations (Finney & Lesieur, 1982, Vaughan, 1983).  Therefore, it 
                                                 
2 Later in the paper, I discuss the impact of profit-squeeze on union members’ ability to influence 
inspections. It is reasonable to assume that this influence may be minimized when firms are experiencing 
profit-squeeze because unions may direct their attention at issues other than health and safety, e.g., wages 
and benefits.  In this case, they may be less likely to file complaints or accompany inspectors on 
inspections.  However, it is unlikely that the effect of unions on inspection behavior completely disappears, 
especially in light of the findings by Bartel & Thomas (1985).  If OSHA inspectors are inspecting nonunion 
firms more heavily to impose higher costs, then unions may be more likely to encourage this practice by 
OSHA during times of financial distress in order to put nonunion competitors out of business.  Thus, it is 
still important to control for union membership even during times of financial distress when union 
members might file fewer complaints against their own companies. 
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 seems important to include a measure of prior violations in a study examining the 
relationship between financial performance and OSHA violations.  Thus, in this study, I 
contribute to the corporate crime literature by including a control for enforcement 
behavior and a measure of prior offending in my examination of the relationship between 
declining profits and OSHA violations. 3
 Before proceeding, however, it is important to define corporate crime and profit-
squeeze.  There is no universally agreed-upon definition for corporate crime.  The debate 
surrounding the definition usually focuses on whether it should be an offense- or 
offender-based definition and whether it should include all illegal behavior or just 
criminal behavior (Sutherland, 1983, Tappan, 1977, Clinard & Yeager, 1980, Shapiro, 
1990).  Also in dispute is whether the definition should encompass the behavior of 
corporations, the individuals employed by them, or both.   
According to Clinard and Yeager (1980) corporate crime is “any act committed 
by corporations that is punished by the state, regardless of whether it is punished under 
administrative, civil, or criminal law” (p. 16).  For this research, Clinard and Yeager’s 
(1980) definition of corporate crime provides the best fit for the data.  It is an offense-
based definition that encompasses a wide range of behaviors including, tax and securities 
violations, intentional pollution of the environment, numerous anticompetitive behaviors 
(e.g., price-fixing), and the focus of this study: knowingly failing to provide a safe work 
environment.  It focuses on acts committed by corporations, which is what OSHA 
                                                 
3 Violations of OSHA include infractions of both worker health and worker safety.  Firms can be cited for 
relatively minor violations, like failure to post safety instructions and failure to maintain records on health 
and safety.  On the other end of the spectrum, firms might be cited for lack of safety equipment, poor 
electrical wiring, and any worker illnesses, injuries, or deaths that result from the violations of an OSHA 
standard.  The data are readily available from OSHA’s Management Information System (MIS) and 
provide detailed information about facility characteristics, inspections, offense types, and penalties.  
 
 5
 investigates, and it widens the net of illegal behaviors to include any act by corporations 
punishable by the state rather than simply those acts punishable by criminal law.  This is 
integral to this study since OSHA enforcement is based on administrative, and not 
criminal, penalties. 
Profit-squeeze is generally defined as a decline in profits.  In order to more fully 
understand profit-squeeze, then, it is first necessary to define profit.  The most basic 
definition of profit is the difference between a company’s total revenue and total costs.  
With this in mind, there are three ways a company can experience profit-squeeze.  First, 
if a company’s revenues remain constant while costs rise, the company will experience 
profit-squeeze.  Alternatively, if a company’s revenues rise but its costs rise even faster, 
the company will experience profit-squeeze.  Finally, if a company’s revenue falls while 
costs rise, remain constant, or fall slower than revenue, the company will experience 
profit-squeeze (Kalecki, 1991).  The extent to which profit-squeeze is harmful to a 
company is relative, but for the purposes of this paper, the larger the decline in profits, 
the greater the profit-squeeze is assumed to be.      
In the next section, I introduce the theoretical framework for the profit-squeeze 
argument followed by a review of the empirical evidence, including the few studies that 
have used OSHA data.  The second section provides a brief introduction to OSHA and its 
inspection procedures, violations and fines.  I describe characteristics of the four 
industries from which the sample in this study is drawn in the third section, and in the 
fourth section, I detail the data and methods used.  The next section reports the results of 
the analysis, and that section is followed by a discussion of the results and my 
conclusions.  
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 Chapter II - Literature Review 
Theoretical Background 
Rational choice theory is based on the classical view that human behavior can be 
explained by the basic human characteristics of rationality and intelligence   This 
classical school of thought also holds that each person possesses free will to choose his or 
her own fate (Bentham, 1977, Beccaria, 1963).  Given these tenets, crime is seen as the 
choice of the individual who has rationally weighed the costs and benefits of his actions.  
Rational choice theory, therefore, states that to deter individuals from committing crime, 
the punishment must outweigh the benefits of the crime.  In order to achieve this goal, 
punishments must be proportionate to the severity of the crime; punishments that are 
either too lenient or too severe will not deter crime (Beccaria, 1963).  Punishments must 
also be prompt or swift so that the criminal associates the punishment with the crime, and 
they should be certain so that anyone committing a crime knows that they will be 
punished for the crime.  The deterrent quality of punishments is lost if criminals 
continually do not receive punishment for their crimes (Beccaria, 1963).       
Rational choice theories are generally thought to be especially applicable to 
corporate offenses because they are assumed to be highly rational and calculated crimes 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1993).  Corporate crimes are rarely crimes of passion and are 
more likely the result of a manager weighing the costs and benefits of an illegal action.  
Accordingly, managers of companies will violate the law to attain organizational goals 
when the expected profit is higher than the potential penalties (Vaughan, 1998).  
Paternoster and Simpson (1993) assert, however, that the classical rational choice model 
with its emphasis on formal costs is unlikely to be adequate to explain corporate crime.  
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 They propose a rational choice theory that focuses on perceived costs and benefits and 
includes informal as well as formal costs and benefits of actions.  The formal costs are 
similar to those listed above, but they are the perceived certainty and severity of formal 
legal sanctions.  The informal costs include negative publicity for the corporation and 
disapproval from friends and family (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993).  The authors also 
include the perceived certainty and severity of loss of self-respect and the perceived costs 
of rule compliance and perceived benefits of rule violation.  The empirical tests of this 
revised rational choice theory showed that it might more accurately capture the decision 
making of corporate offenders compared to the classical rational choice theory (Simpson, 
2002).  Managers did fear formal sanctions and considered them consequential, but they 
did not seem to adjust their behavior based on formal sanctions.  Managers considered 
threats to significant relationships, feeling of guilt, and the negative impact on the 
reputation of the firm (Simpson, 2002).             
Managers are generally assumed to be risk-averse; that is, they are generally 
unwilling to jeopardize the future of their corporation or their position in it (Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1993).  As a result, punishments available to corporate offenders, such as fines 
and loss of relationships and punishments available to corporations, such as fines and 
damage to their reputation, are viewed as meaningful threats to potential corporate 
offenders.  Declining profits, though, can alter the manager’s perceptions of these threats 
as well as the benefits of illegal actions.  Economic performance is one of the major 
factors used to determine the reputation of a company and so poor financial performance 
may minimize these formal and informal threats while maximizing the benefits of illegal 
gains.  Thus, the manager of a failing company might not consider the harm to the 
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 reputation of a firm if s/he perceives that the firm has less reputation at stake (Alexander 
& Cohen, 1996).  Further, the manager might even perceive the crime as a way to 
improve the firm’s reputation by increasing its profitability.  By ignoring OSHA 
regulations, for instance, a manager could reduce costs, thereby inflating revenue.  
Similarly, the manager of a failing company may worry that friends and colleagues will 
think of him or her as a failure or that the respect of colleagues and friends is lost so the 
loss of those relationships may not represent the threat they would to a manager of a 
thriving company.  Alternatively, the same manager might not weigh the cost of criminal, 
civil, or regulatory fines, believing that the company would be unable to pay them in a 
state of bankruptcy (Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  Therefore, an illegal act that would 
raise profits or reduce costs and prevent bankruptcy might seem worth the risk.  
In the case of OSHA violations, rational choice explanations seem especially 
applicable because the formal penalties for OSHA violations have been historically 
sporadic and minor due to infrequent inspections (Gleason & Barnum, 1976, Bartel & 
Thomas, 1985, Weil, 1996).  Infrequent inspections lower the probability of detection and 
hence punishment, including both formal and informal sanctions.  (If a company is not 
formally sanctioned, there is less chance that family and friends will be aware of a 
manager’s actions and less chance that the reputation of the firm will be tarnished).  This 
is specifically true for the time period covered in this study.  In the early 1990s, 
inspections were stabilized at roughly 40,000 annually, but they fell to 29,000 annually in 
1995 and 24,259 in 1996, the lowest levels in OSHA’s history.  A partial recovery in 
inspections did occur from 1997-2000, bringing inspections up to 36,613 in 2000.  At the 
same time, penalties did increase from an average of $461 per violation in 1991 to $900 
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 per violation in 2000 (Siskind, 2002).  Despite this increase, penalties remained fairly 
minor throughout this study period.  In other words, inspections and penalties have not 
been certain or severe, and so the risk of penalty and its cost are likely to be perceived as 
low.  
Conversely, the savings a company can achieve by ignoring OSHA regulations 
can be high since many regulations require expensive renovations to plants, new 
machinery and/or new safety equipment (Gleason & Barnum, 1976).  Thus, a usually 
risk-averse manager of a company, when faced with declining profits and changing 
perceptions of informal threats, could weigh the uncertain and minor costs of formal 
threats from OSHA against the money saved from disobeying regulations and decide to 
violate OSHA standards in order to save money.  Scholz and Gray (1990) provide 
evidence that this cost-benefit calculus of getting caught does occur concerning OSHA 
violations; they found evidence that firms monitor OSHA enforcement activity and 
respond by decreasing injury rates when perceived enforcement risk increases.  The 
authors also discovered that firms reduced injury rates after OSHA assessed penalties 
against them.  This specific deterrence effect occurred when controlling for the expected 
penalty associated with general deterrence, which suggests the importance of “surprise” 
in focusing manager attention on enforcement risk (Scholz & Gray, 1990).    
Empirical Support 
Despite the theoretical basis for a relationship between organizational 
performance and corporate crime, empirical evidence on the relationship is mixed.  Many 
early studies of large firms discovered a significant negative relationship between 
organizational performance and various antitrust violations.  For example, Staw and 
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 Szwajkowski (1975) found that for the five years preceding a trade complaint, the 
financial performance of 105 violating firms was significantly below all other 
nonviolating firms on the Fortune 500 List during the period of 1968-1972.  They also 
found that the financial performance of the industries of the violating firms was also 
lower than the performance of industries of nonviolating firms on the Fortune 500 list.  
Similarly, Asch and Seneca (1976) reported that for 51 collusive firms selected from the 
Fortune 500 list, collusive behavior4 was negatively associated with firm profitability.  
Simpson (1987) found that macro-level profit-squeeze had a positive relationship with 
antitrust and trade violations for 52 survivor firms in seven basic manufacturing 
industries between 1927 and 1981.  However, when her data were disaggregated, she 
found that more serious anti-competitive behaviors occurred during periods of declining 
industry profitability (Simpson, 1986).   
More recent studies of other offense types also reported support for a profit 
motive-crime relationship.  Jenkins and Braithwaite (1993) analyzed questionnaires from 
410 for-profit and non-profit nursing homes in Australia.  They found that for-profit 
homes, which operate under the pressure to turn a profit, broke the new federal 
regulations more often than the non-profit homes.  The authors noted that their findings 
replicate those found for nursing homes in the United States.  McKendall et al. (1999) 
also demonstrated a relationship between profits and corporate crime.  In their analysis of 
150 large manufacturing firms, the authors reported that lower industry profits were 
significantly and positively related to both serious and non-serious Environmental 
                                                 
4 Collusion is the illegal act of firms conspiring to fix prices or divide markets in order to increase profits 
(Asch & Seneca (1976). 
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 Protection Act (EPA) violations, and lower firm profits were significantly and positively 
associated with serious EPA violations.         
The preceding studies indicated general support for a relationship between poor 
economic performance and various illegal behaviors.  However, as McKendall et al. 
(1999) pointed out, several recent and more methodologically complex studies have not 
replicated the same profit-squeeze and corporate crime relationship.  For instance, Hill et 
al. (1992) completely failed to find a relationship between organizational performance 
and corporate crime.  Using EPA and OSHA violations for 174 Fortune 1000 
manufacturing firms, Hill et al. (1992) found no statistical support for the hypothesis that 
financial strain influenced the predisposition of managers to violate the law and actually 
found the opposite, that firms were more likely, though not significantly more likely, to 
behave illegally when their performance was moderate or good.  Finally, Baucus & Near 
(1991) reported weak evidence of a relationship between profits and illegal behavior, but 
one in the opposite direction so that firms with good financial performance committed 
more violations than firms in financial distress.  Interestingly, the authors also found a 
curvilinear relationship between environmental munificence and violations.  Illegal 
behavior was likely when resources were scarce but even more likely when resources 
were plentiful.  These studies demonstrate that the empirical evidence on the exact 
relationship between organizational performance and corporate crime is equivocal.  
As mentioned earlier, other studies have included OSHA data in their samples to 
examine the profit-squeeze argument.  These studies also provide mixed evidence on the 
relationship.  For example, Alexander and Cohen (1996) examined 101 public 
corporations convicted of federal violations spanning fraud, environmental crimes, 
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 antitrust violations, regulatory violations and safety violations.  Since OSHA rarely 
brings criminal charges against corporations, though, the OSHA violations made up only 
5% of their sample.  The authors did not find any relationship between prior earnings 
growth and safety violations and only found slight evidence for a relationship between 
prior sales growth and their small sample of safety violations.  In fact, with the exception 
of the environmental violations, which made up less than one fourth of their sample, the 
authors were unable to find a strong connection between firm profits and crime.  As 
mentioned above, Hill et al. (1992) analyzed OSHA and EPA violations for 174 U.S. 
Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms.  In their study, OSHA violations actually made up the 
largest number of violations at 6,233 compared to 343 EPA violations.  However, they, 
too, failed to find a negative relationship between financial strain and OSHA violations.  
McKendall et al. (2002) used OSHA violations in their examination of the relationship 
between ethical compliance programs and corporate illegality.  While the focus of their 
paper was not the financial performance of their sample, they did control for an 
organization’s profitability.  This variable was the only control variable to significantly 
predict willful and repeat violations, in that lower firm profitability was associated with 
more violations (McKendall et al., 2002).  The results of this study provide some 
evidence that profit-squeeze may be linked to OSHA violations. 
One reason for the mixed findings in the corporate crime literature on the 
relationship between financial strain and illegal behaviors could be the lack of a common 
measure for organizational performance (Keane, 1993).  The studies mentioned above 
used a variety of measures for the independent variable, financial performance.  For 
example, Asch and Seneca (1976) used the mean value of the ratio of net income after 
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 taxes to stockholder’s equity; Hill et al. (1992) used Altman’s Z index; and Alexander 
and Cohen (1996) used prior sales and employment growth of the firm as well as an 
industry-adjusted earnings growth variable.  Operationalizing the performance variable 
can be problematic and may be one factor causing the divergent findings. 
Keane (1993) attempted to improve the measurement of financial performance by 
thinking of it as a latent concept since companies have multiple financial performance 
goals.  He hypothesized that two latent financial performance variables, one at the firm 
level and one at the industry level, would have equal effects, and that companies and 
industries experiencing poor financial performance would cope with this strain using 
illegal behavior.  Keane (1993) used financial ratios as indicators of financial 
performance including Net Income to Total Sales and Net Income to Total Assets, which 
provided measures of the firm’s efficiency of operation.  He also used Earnings Per Share 
and Working Capital to Total Assets, although the latter ratio was the least reliable of his 
measures.  Using these financial ratios as indicators of financial performance, Keane 
(1993) found that firms experiencing a decline in financial performance over the five-
year period 1971-1975 were more likely to be charged with a violation.  By using latent 
financial performance variables, Keane (1993) replicated the negative relationship found 
in earlier studies between financial performance and illegal behavior.5  
Another reason for the mixed results in the literature could be the lack of a 
common measure for illegal behavior.  McKendall et al. (1999), Simpson (1986), and 
Keane (1993) measured illegal behavior using administrative, civil, and criminal 
sanctions brought against companies in their samples.  Hill et al. (1992), on the other 
                                                 
5 Keane used data collected by Clinard and Yeager (1980) so illegal behavior was captured through federal 
administrative, civil, and criminal actions initiated or completed by 25 federal agencies during 1975-1976. 
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 hand, used only administrative sanctions brought by the EPA and OSHA, while Baucus 
& Near (1991), Asch & Seneca (1976), and Alexander & Cohen (1996) all used criminal 
convictions for a Federal crime as their measure of illegal behavior.  This variation in the 
measurement of illegal behavior could be another reason for the diverse findings in the 
literature on whether declining profits affect corporate offending.   
Yet another possible reason for the disparate findings may rest with the offense 
type under investigation.  It is possible that financial performance pressure is more likely 
to lead to some violations than others.  Alexander and Cohen (1996) arrive at a similar 
explanation for their findings, concluding that performance is more likely to affect the 
occurrence of environmental crime than fraud because frauds tend to occur in the context 
of a voluntary transaction.  Hill et al. (1991) actually test for the possibility that different 
antecedents lead to different types of illegality.  Although their results were mixed, they 
concluded that firm performance was related to different illegal behaviors. 
While findings in the literature have been mixed on the effects of profit-squeeze 
at the firm level on illegal behavior, the literature has provided stronger evidence for a 
relationship between economic performance and criminal actions at the industry level. 
Empirical research has shown that the market (or industry) in which a firm operates is 
related to offending at the firm level (Keane, 1993, Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  One 
industry characteristic that has been shown to influence criminal behavior is profitability.  
In their analyses, McKendall et al. (1999) and Keane (1993) found that both firm and 
industry profitability significantly predicted illegal behaviors.  In McKendall et al.’s 
(1999) analysis of the relationship between environmental violations and dimensions of 
corporate board structure, the control variables for firm and industry profitability were 
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 significantly and negatively related to violations.  As mentioned above, Keane (1993) 
found that firms experiencing a decline in financial performance between 1971-1975 
were more likely to be charged with criminal, civil, and administrative violations.  He 
also found that firms in industries that were experiencing similar financial strain were 
more likely to be charged with a violation.   
Alternatively, Simpson (2002), and Clinard and Yeager (1980) found industry 
characteristics to be more important and consistent predictors of corporate offending than 
firm level measures.  Simpson (1986) analyzed 52 survivor firms over 55 years of 
economic and criminal activity.  She reported that firm level financial performance was 
unrelated to antitrust behavior but that as industry profitability decreased, antitrust crimes 
increased; this relationship held for three of her four industries.  Interestingly, when 
Simpson (1986) broke the dependent variable into serious and trivial categories, she 
found decreasing industry profits led to serious crimes while increasing industry profits 
led to more trivial crimes.   
Alexander and Cohen (1996), using environmental violations, also discovered an 
interesting interactive effect between firm and industry performance.  They found that the 
performance of the corporation relative to that of the industry best predicted violations 
(Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  In other words, firms with declining profits in an 
economically healthy industry were more likely to violate environmental regulations. 
The empirical literature also showed that the concentration of an industry can 
influence illegal behavior.  The concentration of an industry is the number of firms 
operating in that industry, which determines the market power held by firms and their 
ability to compete in the industry.  Studies showed that both high and low industry 
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 concentration may create the opportunity for illegal behavior.  For example, a small 
number of firms in an industry make collusion easier while a large number of firms make 
it difficult for regulatory agencies to monitor and detect illegalities (McKendall et al., 
2002).  A few studies have confirmed that industry concentration is indeed related to 
illegal corporate behavior, but that concentration (like size) may have different effects 
depending on industry of offense type.  Asch and Seneca (1976) found that concentration 
increased the probability of collusion in the consumer goods industry but decreased 
probability of collusion in the producer goods industry.  McKendall et al. (1999) and 
McKendall and Wagner (1997) found that lower levels of industry concentration were 
positively related to serious environmental law violations.  It seems likely that low 
industry concentration could affect opportunities for OSHA violations since a larger 
number of firms would strain the already tight resources of OSHA, making it safer for 
firms to take more risks. 
Prior violations are a well-known predictor of future violations in both the wider 
criminological literature (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2001, 
Agnew, 1991) and the corporate crime literature (Sutherland, 1983, Baucus & Near, 
1991, Simpson & Koper, 1997).  Yet prior violations have never been included in a study 
of profit-squeeze and OSHA violations.  One study that investigated the relationship 
between profit-squeeze and illegal corporate behavior found that companies with three or 
more prior violations were significantly more likely to engage in antitrust, product 
liability, and discrimination than firms without three or more prior violations (Baucus & 
Near, 1991).   
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 In the current study, I further investigate the possible relationship between poor 
firm and industry financial performance and corporate crime using violations cited by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) from the years 1993-2000.  As 
mentioned earlier, I attempt to improve upon the studies that have used OSHA violations 
in the past by controlling for OSHA enforcement behavior and prior OSHA violations.  
Before describing the research design and data used in this thesis, a brief description of 
OSHA and its policies and practices is provided.  In addition, I present a brief overview 
of characteristics of the four industries that are included in this research.   
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Since its inception in 1971, the mission of OSHA has been to ensure safe and 
healthful workplaces in America through enforcement of OSHA regulations.  The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, which sets forth standards, laws, and regulations in 
the interest of labor safety, was passed in 1970, in large part as a response to protests by 
rank-and-file workers against working conditions that annually killed at least 100,000 
U.S. workers and disabled another 390,000 (Donnelly 1982).  Under accusations that 
OSHA was merely a symbolic gesture and useless for enforcement of safety and health 
regulations and amidst the deregulation policies of the Reagan administration, OSHA 
experienced difficulty in its first two decades of existence (Calavita, 1983).  However, 
since its inception, the number of workers employed in the U.S. has doubled while 
workplace fatalities have declined by 50%, and occupational injuries and illnesses have 
declined 40% (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004a).   
 Despite the steady declines in workplace fatalities, injuries, and illnesses, only 
modest evidence has been produced to show OSHA has had a direct impact on injuries 
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 and illnesses.  Several studies using injury and illness data and OSHA inspection data 
actually found that OSHA had no impact on firms’ injury rates (Viscusi, 1978, 
McCaffrey, 1983, and Ruser & Smith, 1990).  The majority of studies, though, seem to 
have found some modest direct and indirect effects of OSHA inspections and penalties on 
injury rates (Smith, 1978, Cooke & Gautschi, 1981, Robertson & Keeve, 1983, Bartel & 
Thomas, 1985, Viscusi, 1986, Scholz & Gray, 1990, Gray & Jones, 1991).  For instance, 
Cooke and Gautschi (1981) found a substantial and significant reduction in days lost due 
to injuries in Maine manufacturing firms with 200 or more employees.  Viscusi (1986) 
reported some evidence for the effectiveness of inspections in preventing severe injuries 
during the sample years from 1973-1983.  Gray and Jones (1991) found that the initial 
inspection of an establishment reduced subsequent violations but that following 
inspections had little effect on compliance.  Overall, the empirical evidence on OSHA 
effectiveness is mixed, but there is modest evidence that OSHA enforcement helps make 
workplaces safer for workers.   
 OSHA enforces workplace safety through inspections and fines, and is authorized 
to conduct workplace inspections and investigations to determine whether employers are 
complying with standards issued by the agency.  Inspections are conducted for four main 
reasons.  First, accidents are reported to OSHA by employers and receive high priority 
for inspections when they result in death or hospitalization of three or more employees.  
OSHA inspectors investigate to determine the cause of the accident and whether 
regulations were violated.  Complaints and referrals by employees generate inspections 
and are second in priority to accidents.  OSHA policies give all employees the right to 
request an OSHA inspection if they believe a standard is being violated.  Third, OSHA 
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 places the next priority on programmed inspections.  These general schedule inspections 
can be aimed at specific high-hazard industries, workplace, occupations or health 
substances, or they can be randomly selected.6  Planned inspections generally result in a 
bias toward larger corporations being inspected more often than small corporations 
(Scholz & Gray, 1990, Ruser & Smith, 1990, Weil, 1991, Weil, 1996).  Finally, 
inspections can also originate from the need to follow-up a previous inspection that 
resulted in a citation.  Inspection tours can cover part or all of an establishment, even if 
the inspection resulted from a specific complaint or accident (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2002). 
Inspections can result in one or more violations, which range in seriousness and 
carry various fines (See Table 1, p.21).  Other-Than-Serious violations (‘other’) are 
violations that have a direct relationship to job safety and health but probably would not 
cause death or serious physical harm.  OSHA can assess a penalty of up to $1000 per 
violation for ‘other’ violations.  Serious violations are classified as violations where there 
is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result.  These 
violations can incur penalties from $1,500 to $7,000 depending on the gravity of the 
violation.  Willful violations are violations that the employer intentionally and knowingly 
commits.  In other words, the employer is aware that a dangerous condition exists, knows 
the condition violates a standard of OSHA, and makes no reasonable effort to eliminate 
it.  The minimum penalty for a willful violation is $5,000, and the maximum is $70,000.  
An employer who is convicted in a criminal proceeding of a willful violation that has 
resulted in the death of an employee may be fined up to $250,000 or imprisoned up to 6 
                                                 
6 Establishments are randomly selected by industry.  OSHA designates a given industry as a priority for 
planned inspections, and then each area office compiles a list of establishments in those industries in their 
area and selects sites from that list at random (Gomez, 1997).   
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 months, or both.  Repeat violations are violations of any standard where, upon 
reinspection, a similar violation is found.  OSHA can propose up to $70,000 for each 
repeat violation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2002).  In 1991, OSHA instituted a new 
policy that, in effect, removed an earlier willful or repeat violation, replacing them with 
an unclassified violation.  This designation was given if an employer corrected all 
violations and paid all the fines but wished to be purged of the averse public perception  
attached to a willful or repeat violation (Siskind, 2002).  Consequently, records of willful 
and repeat violations are difficult to track through the entire inspection process.  Willful 
and repeat violations cited in the initial report may be unclassified in the final violation 
report stage.     
Table 1. OSHA Violation Types  
 
VIOLATION 
TYPE 
DESCRIPTION MINIMUM 
FINE 
MAXIMUM 
FINE 
Other Related to job safety and health but 
would not result in death or serious 
physical harm 
$0 $1000 
Serious Substantial probability that death or 
serious physical harm could result 
$1500 $7000 
Willful Intentionally and knowingly 
committed 
$5000 $70000 
Repeat Upon reinspection, similar violation 
is found 
$5000 $70000 
Unclassified Reclassification of willful or repeat 
violations to purge company of 
averse public reaction 
$5000 $70000 
The above policies are relevant to all states covered by Federal OSHA (Fed 
OSHA); however, some states administer their own occupational safety and health 
programs.  OSHA approves and monitors state plans and provides up to 50% of an 
approved plan’s operating costs.  During the 1990s, there were 21 states with their own 
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 state plans.7  All state plans have standards that are “at least as effective as” comparable 
federal standards, and most states adopt standards identical to the federal standards and 
have similar inspection procedures, including citations and penalties8 (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2004b).  During the 1990s, states with state plans conducted about twice the 
number of inspections that Fed OSHA did, and a larger proportion of their inspections 
were conducted in industries other than manufacturing and construction.  The state plan 
states also tended to cite more violations than Fed OSHA, however, the states generally 
assessed lower penalties per violations (Siskind, 2002).  Due to the different inspection 
processes of Fed OSHA and state OSHA programs, I plan to include a control variable 
for the two programs; this is discussed further in the data and methods section of this 
paper. 
As mentioned earlier, OSHA inspections were not stable during the time period of 
interest in this paper.  In the early 1990s, inspections were stabilized at roughly 40,000 
annually.  Due to threatened budget cuts and an emphasis on egregious violations, which 
use more resources, inspections fell steeply in 1995 to 29,000 annually and continued to 
decline in 1996 until they reached 24,259, the lowest levels in OSHA’s history.  A partial 
recovery in inspections did occur from 1997-2000, bringing inspections up to 36,613 in 
2000 (Siskind, 2002).  This change in OSHA inspections is discussed more in the data 
and methods section of the paper.   
 
 
                                                 
7 States with their own state plans included: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.    
8 States with standards that were not identical to Fed OSHA included California, Hawaii, 
Michigan, Oregon, and Washington. 
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 Industry Overviews 
 As shown in the literature review, the environment in which the firms operate is 
an important consideration for the profit-squeeze argument.  Empirical research reviewed 
earlier showed that the industry in which a firm operates is an important predictor of 
corporate crime (Keane, 1993, Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  Some studies reported that 
industry characteristics were stronger predictors of corporate crime than firm level 
characteristics (Simpson, 2002, and Clinard & Yeager, 1980) while other studies 
suggested interaction effects between the firm and industry characteristics (Alexander & 
Cohen, 1996).  In addition to the empirical support, there are theoretical reasons for 
examining industry characteristics.  I have argued that under normal operating conditions 
formal and informal threats are typically strong enough to deter the risk-averse managers 
of companies.  However, when managers are faced with economic failure, these threats 
are minimized and the benefits of illegal actions are amplified (Alexander & Cohen, 
1996).  Profit-squeeze at the industry level can have a similar effect by further 
minimizing informal and formal threats (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996, Simpson, 2002).  
If an entire industry is failing economically, this means many managers are readjusting 
their perception of formal and informal sanctions.  They may also adjust their perception 
of the regulations themselves and see the regulations as restraining the industry’s ability 
to make a profit.  In this context, violating the regulations may become commonplace in 
an industry.  This would minimize the informal sanctions further if coworkers, 
employers, and even family sanctioned the violation because they believed the 
regulations to be unfair and harmful to the industry.  Other industry characteristics, like 
concentration, also can minimize the threat of formal and informal sanctions.  OSHA 
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 inspections have been historically infrequent due to restricted resources in the agency and 
in industries with many firms these resources are stretched especially thin (Gleason & 
Barnum, 1976, Bartel & Thomas, 1985, Weil, 1996).  Thus, firms in these industries may 
perceive that they are less likely to get caught for violating OSHA standards.  In this 
section, I provide an overview of the four industries and examine these industry 
characteristics.      
The firms in this study operate in four industries: the pulp, paper, steel, and oil 
industries.  This thesis expands on data collected by Simpson & Garner (2001) so the four 
industries were chosen based on their relevance for examining EPA water permit 
violations.9  The industries, therefore, were not specifically chosen for the analysis of 
OSHA data or a profit-squeeze argument.  Fortunately, the industries are also subject to 
OSHA regulations and turned out to have substantial variation in offending patterns.  Hill 
et al. (1992) reported that the paper and steel industries were among the worst offenders 
in their sample while oil was an average offender.  My data reflect a similar pattern, with 
paper and steel being the worst offenders measured by an average rate of total violations 
per inspection over the eight-year period.  However, the oil industry rate was not, on 
average, much lower than the rate for the steel industry, and this industry produced the 
highest average rate of the most serious violations per inspection.  The pulp industry had 
the lowest rate of total violations but slightly more serious violations per inspection than 
paper (See Table 2, p.25).  The limitation of using these four industries is that, as I will 
discuss below, there is not a great deal of variation in the key characteristics of interest.  
It is still important, though, to know what variation does exist between the four industries 
                                                 
9 The industries are known to be above average polluters (see McKendall & Wagner, 1997 and Magat & 
Viscusi, 1990) and they utilize similar chemicals in their manufacturing processes making comparisons 
across industries possible. 
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 because these characteristics might drive illegal firm actions.  In this section, I briefly 
review the empirical literature on industry effects that are relevant to OSHA policies and 
violations, including economic performance, industrial concentration, and specific OSHA 
regulations that apply to each industry.  The pulp and paper industries are highly 
interconnected; however, analysis (discussed in the Statistical Procedure section) 
suggests that it is best to treat them as separate industries. 10    
Table 2.  Average Rates of Violations per Inspection by Industry from 1993-2000 
 
INDUSTRY RATE OF TOTAL 
VIOLATIONS PER 
INSPECTION (TOTAL 
AVERAGE VIOLATIONS) 
RATE OF MOST SERIOUS 
VIOLATIONS PER INSPECTION 
(TOTAL AVERAGE SERIOUS 
VIOLATIONS) 
Pulp 2.1888 (11.188) .1243 (.625) 
Paper 3.7181 (73.539) .1135 (2.385) 
Oil 3.5307 (42.526) 1.3550 (7.526) 
Steel 3.6804 (60.063) 1.0428 (16.250) 
Economic Performance 
The corporate crime literature reviewed earlier showed that industry profitability 
is relevant to corporate illegality.  Most findings suggested that firms in industries with 
declining profits are more likely to commit illegal actions than firms in industries with 
steady or growing profits (Simpson, 1986, Keane, 1993, McKendall et al., 1999). 
Therefore, it is important to be familiar with the economic status of the three industries in 
my study.   
 Leading up to the period of interest for this study (1993-2000), the four industries 
experienced similar patterns of economic decline, although the petroleum industry fared 
                                                 
10 The industries are interconnected because pulp facilities produce pulp, which is utilized in the 
production of paper products.  Also, the majority of facilities in these two industries operate as both pulp 
and paper facilities or as paper-only facilities.  There are very few pulp-only facilities, 50 out of 555 pulp 
and paper facilities, in the United States (SNP Pulp and Paper, 1995). 
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 the best.  In the mid-1990s, the industries all returned to more economically stable 
conditions.  Paper and pulp industries began to generate returns in 1994 that met the cost 
of capital, and mills operated at between 92 and 95 percent of capacity (SNP Pulp and 
Paper, 1995).  In 1993, the steel industry was able to increase prices for the first time 
since 1989, and manufacturers’ shipments were at their highest level since 1981 (SNP 
Steel, 1995).  In the oil industry the economic hardship was isolated to smaller firms so 
the total refinery output of finished products remained relatively stable throughout the 
period with slight increases in 1993 and 1994 (SNP Petroleum, 1995).   
Table 3 (p.27) displays the manufacturer’s value added (MVA) for each industry 
across the eight-year time period.  The MVA is the estimated value of production within 
each industry.  Due to the fact that the industries were not chosen with the intention of 
examining a profit-squeeze argument, they are more similar in economic performance 
than would be desirable for an examination of the profit-squeeze argument.  However, 
there are some subtle differences.  The oil industry appears to have performed at the 
highest level with continuously increasing profits except in 1998.  The paper and steel 
industries were a little more erratic, but they generally performed well.  The pulp 
industry’s MVA appears to be cut by half from 1995 to 1996 and then again from 1996 to 
1997, but both the pulp and paper industries seem to have experienced a spike in profits 
in 1995 and without that jump, the pulp industry also seems fairly stable.  Thus, I expect 
that firms in the oil industry will commit the fewest violations and the fewest serious 
violations if a profit-squeeze argument is accurate.   
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Table 3.  Manufacturer’s Value Added by Industry by Year 
INDUSTRY YEAR MVA INDUSTRY YEAR MVA 
Pulp 1993 1,711,100,000 Paper 1993 14,511,700,000 
 1994 2,093,300,000  1994 15,077,200,000 
 1995 4,223,000,000  1995 22,509,700,000 
 1996 2,201,100,000  1996 18,848,000,000 
 1997 1,507,468,000  1997 17,578,226,000 
 1998 1,403,944,000  1998 17,795,562,000 
 1999 1,442,824,000  1999 18,004,180,000 
 2000 1,827,072,000  2000 19,063,360,000 
Steel 1993 17,908,300,000 Oil 1993 18,710,300,000 
 1994 20,743,800,000  1994 23,805,600,000 
 1995 22,191,200,000  1995 23,978,100,000 
 1996 22,111,900,000  1996 26,005,800,000 
 1997 24,741,363,000  1997 30,878,456,000 
 1998 23,733,366,000  1998 24,023,637,000 
 1999 21,360,675,000  1999 31,516,328,000 
 2000 14,353,827,000  2000 36,634,094,000 
 
Industrial Concentration 
   The studies discussed in the literature review also demonstrated a relation 
between the concentration of an industry and corporate offending.  As stated earlier, both 
high and low industry concentration may create the opportunity for illegal behavior 
depending on the type of behavior.  I argued previously that low industry concentration 
would be most likely to affect opportunities for OSHA violations since a larger number 
of firms would place greater strain on the already overextended resources of OSHA.  
With OSHA inspectors spreading themselves thin throughout a highly populated 
industry, managers of firms will perceive a minimized threat of discovery and take more 
risks. 
Prices in the petroleum refining industry are controlled by an oligopoly, meaning 
that due to the small number of suppliers accounting for a large amount of output, one 
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 supplier’s actions can greatly affect pricing in the market (Rosen, 1995).  This oligopoly 
pricing is one of the key signs of high concentration.  Prices tend to be more volatile in 
the pulp and paper industry absent true price leadership; however, there are significant 
barriers to entry in the pulp and paper industry, which keep the industry more 
concentrated than it would be otherwise.  Barriers include extensive capital costs caused, 
in part, by environmental protection legislation and the limited number of sites in the 
U.S. suitable for integrated pulp and paper mill operations, which must be close to 
woodlands (Arpan et al., 1986).  Oligopoly pricing collapsed in the steel industry in the 
early 1980s and a system of price-taking has been universal since 1995 in what is now a 
largely free steel market (Hall, 1997) 11.  These are signs that the steel industry is no 
longer very concentrated.   
In fact, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is the best measure of 
industry concentration, shows that none of the four industries in my sample are highly 
concentrated.  In general, a market with an HHI below 1000 can be characterized as not 
concentrated, between 1000 and 1800 as moderately concentrated and above 1800 as 
highly concentrated (European Communities, 2003).  As shown in Table 4 (p. 29), the 
pulp industry had an average HHI of 984 compared to 428 for paper, 439 for oil and 501 
for steel.  Once again, this is a limitation of using these industries for this particular 
study; ideally, the industries would vary more in their concentration levels.  However, the 
pulp industry has the highest average HHI and reached a maximum of 1106 during the 
study period, which means that the pulp industry was at least moderately concentrated.  
                                                 
11 Price-taking systems are markets that take prices from other trading venues.  Price-taking is basically the 
opposite of oligopoly pricing where the market sets the price.  Instead, the market takes the price set by 
another market, like the suppliers; this typically occurs in a more competitive market (CESR, 2002). 
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 This suggests that firms in the other three less concentrated industries may perceive a 
greater opportunity to offend and so should have more violations.  Returning to Table 2 
(p. 25), pulp did in fact have the lowest average number of total violations by far with 
11.188.     
Table 4.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by Industry from 1993-2000 
INDUSTRY AVERAGE HHI MINIMUM HHI MAXIMUM HHI 
Pulp 984 858 1106 
Paper 428 392 467 
Oil 438 425 441 
Steel 505 498 551 
 
OSHA Regulations by Industry 
 Presuming that regulatory standards remain stable, firms in regulated industries 
operate in a predictable legal environment.  Firms operating under these conditions are 
able to anticipate and predict compliance costs more easily than firms in less regulated 
industries or industries where regulations are constantly changing.  Furthermore, if 
regulations are believed to be fair and reasonable and are accepted and understood in the 
industry, the industry culture may reinforce the regulations as industry norms.  It is 
important, therefore, to determine whether OSHA regulations were stable in each of the 
four industries examined here.   
All four industries in this study are covered under the General Industry category, 
but this does not mean every standard listed in the General Industry category applies to 
all four industries.  The basic regulations regarding walking and work surfaces, 
emergency and fire plans, ventilation, noise levels, hazardous materials, personal 
protective equipment, sanitation, first aid, electrical wiring, and portable tools apply to all 
industries.  However, each industry has standards that apply specifically to that industry.  
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 None of the regulations, though, seem more restrictive for any single industry in this 
sample.  The pulp and paper industries have special regulations for the preparation of 
pulpwood using power saws and chippers, the chemical process of making pulp using 
sulfur, and bleaching rooms, machines, and chemicals (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2004c).  The petroleum refining industry has special regulations for the distillation 
process involved in producing gasoline and for the handling of the chemical by-products 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2004d).  Similarly, the regulations of the steel industry 
dictate the use of and standards for the blast furnaces and coke ovens involved in the 
conversion of iron to steel (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004d).  Since none of the four 
industries seem more restricted than the others by OSHA policies, and since I do not have 
the data to examine whether any of the industries view the regulations as unfair, I cannot 
draw any conclusions about how differences or changes in the regulatory environment 
might affect illegal behavior of the firms in this sample. 
Prior Injuries and Illnesses by Industry 
 The last industry characteristic I should mention is prior injuries and illnesses 
recorded for each industry.  Studies analyzing the impact of OSHA inspections on injury 
rates have noted that plants with higher previous injury and illness rates generally receive 
more inspections (Cooke & Gautschi, 1981, Ruser & Smith, 1988, Ruser & Smith, 1990).  
In 1981, Fed OSHA decided to utilize mandatory employer injury and illness logs to 
determine which firms to inspect.  If the injury and illness rate from a previous year 
exceeded a certain threshold, the establishment was inspected.  While this practice was 
discontinued in 1988 (Ruser & Smith, 1990), current OSHA documents cite prior injury 
and illness rates as a way to determine general schedule inspections.  Since OSHA policy 
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 allows OSHA inspectors to use injury and illness records to target hazardous industries 
for inspection, it is useful to know if any of the industries in my sample are particularly 
hazardous.  Table 5 (p. 31) shows the steel industry to be much more hazardous than the 
other industries.  The steel industry has an average rate 5.25, almost five times higher 
than the paper industry, which has the next highest average rate at 1.61.  This suggests 
that the steel industry is the most hazardous of the four industries and that it may be more 
likely to be targeted by OSHA inspectors.   
Table 5.  Rate of Injuries and Illnesses by Industry from 1993-2000* 
INDUSTRY RATE OF INJURIES 
& ILLNESSES 
MINIMUM RATE 
OF INJURIES & 
ILLNESSES 
MAXIMUM RATE 
OF INJURIES & 
ILLNESSES 
Pulp .08 .01 .31 
Paper 1.61 .20 5.33 
Oil .99 .04 7.86 
Steel 5.25 .42 15.19 
*Rate calculated by dividing average number of injuries and illnesses by average number of employees 
The industry characteristics discussed above are important because they have 
been shown to affect the probability of corporate offending (Simpson, 1986, Clinard & 
Yeager, 1980, Keane, 1993, McKendall et al. 1999).  The descriptions provided paint a 
picture of the similarities and differences between the four industries, which are 
illustrated in Table 6 (p.32).  These differences allow for inferences of the effects that 
each characteristic should have on the illegal actions of the firms in this study.  For 
instance, the steadily increasing profits in the oil industry leads me to think that firms in 
the oil industry will commit fewer violations than firms in the other three industries.  
Also, due to the lower concentration of the paper, steel, and oil industries, I would expect 
firms in the pulp industry to have fewer violations than the other three industries.  As 
mentioned, the lower concentration makes it more difficult for regulatory agencies like 
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 OSHA to monitor firms.  Relating this to the revised rational choice theory mentioned 
above, managers in industries with low concentration will perceive less of a formal threat 
and commit more illegal actions.  Since all four industries are subject to OSHA 
regulations and I cannot quantify the degree to which variation exists, I cannot predict an 
effect based on the amount of OSHA regulations.  The steel industry appears to be the 
most hazardous in my sample, making it a prime target for more inspections so this 
should be kept in mind throughout the analysis.  Following my hypotheses, the next 
section describes the data and methods that will be used for this analysis. 
Table 6.  Industry Characteristics, 1993-2000 
INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY CONCENTRATION INJURIES & 
ILLNESSES 
Pulp Stable Moderate Low 
Paper Stable Low Moderate 
Oil Mixed Low Moderate 
Steel Stable Low High 
 
Hypotheses 
Managers are generally considered risk-averse and unwilling to jeopardize their 
future or that of their corporation (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993).  Under normal 
operating conditions, then, they are usually deterred by formal and informal sanctions.  
However, when a firm is experiencing declining profits, formal and informal threats are 
minimized (Alexander & Cohen, 1996).  Since OSHA fines are historically minor and 
uncertain due to the low frequency of inspections (Gleason & Barnum, 1976, Weil, 
1996), a manager experiencing profit-squeeze might perceive OSHA violations as a safe 
way to reduce costs by ignoring OSHA regulations, which can require expensive safety 
equipment or new machinery.    
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 This cost-benefit calculus could lead not only to more violations during times of 
financial distress but also to more serious violations of OSHA.  Discussing antitrust 
violations, Simpson (1986) explained that under normal operating conditions (i.e., 
growth), discovery and punishment risks may outweigh the benefits of crime (i.e., 
monetary savings) and serious forms of criminality may be deterred.  However, when a 
company is experiencing financial distress, it may undertake more serious and potentially 
costly illegal behaviors.  
This argument seems relevant for OSHA violations as well as antitrust violations.  
According to OSHA policies, more serious violations can engender more severe 
penalties, including higher fines and possibly jail time (U.S. Department of Labor, 2002).  
Conversely, the benefits of ignoring more serious regulations are greater.  While the 
benefits of more serious antitrust violations are greater profits, the benefits of more 
serious OSHA violations are greater savings.  For instance, by not fixing or replacing 
dangerous machinery, the company saves more money than when it decides not to invest 
in safety regulation posters.  Thus, companies that commit more serious safety and health 
violations can experience greater savings.  Adding to this argument, it is possible that 
under circumstances of financial decline, there is a greater opportunity for firms to 
commit OSHA violations.  Union employees are positioned to influence OSHA 
enforcement, and labor unions dedicate considerable resources to monitoring and 
improving safety and health conditions (Weil, 1991).  In times of financial stress, labor 
unions may focus their efforts on preventing job cuts and maintaining livable wages and 
direct fewer resources to safety issues.  With labor unions focusing on issues other than 
safety, managers of unionized firms may perceive a greater opportunity to violate more 
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 serious OSHA regulations, like ignoring requirements for the replacement of dangerous 
and costly machinery.  On the other hand, during these times of financial stress unionized 
firms may use their influence at OSHA to encourage inspections of nonunionzed firms 
(Bartel & Thomas, 1985).  Due to the influence unions have on OSHA enforcement, it is 
important to control for union membership.  With these issues in mind, I plan to test 
whether profit-squeeze at the firm level increases OSHA violations by firms from the 
steel, petroleum, pulp, and paper industries.  Following Simpson (1986), I also plan to 
examine whether profit-squeeze at the firm level will cause more serious OSHA 
violations by firms in the aforementioned industries.  Hence, my first hypothesis: 
H1: Firms experiencing profit-squeeze will commit more and more serious OSHA 
violations than economically healthy firms. 
Also, studies have shown that industry characteristics may actually be stronger 
predictors of illegal corporate behavior (Simpson, 1987, Clinard & Yeager, 1980).  For 
instance, studies have found that the broader economic environment, i.e., the financial 
status of the industry as a whole, affects corporate offending (McKendall et al., 1999, 
Staw & Szwajkowsi, 1975, Simpson, 1987, Keane, 1993, Alexander & Cohen, 1996, 
Clinard & Yeager, 1980).  Further, studies have shown that other industry level factors, 
like concentration, can create an opportunity for firms to commit move violations and 
more serious violations (Asch & Seneca, 1976, McKendall et al., 1999).  Due to the lack 
of variation in my industry variables and analytic constraints, I am unable to test the 
direct effects of industry characteristics.  However, I can include dummy variables for 
industry membership.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
H2: Controlling for industry, profit-squeeze at the firm-level will be attenuated. 
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 Finally, prior criminal acts are one of the best predictors of future criminal acts.  
This finding has been replicated in both the corporate crime literature (Sutherland, 1983, 
Baucus & Near, 1991, Simpson & Koper, 1997) and the wider criminological literature 
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2001, Agnew, 1991).  This leads 
me to my final hypothesis: 
H3: Firms with prior violations will commit more OSHA violations than firms 
without prior violations. 
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 Chapter III - Sample and Methodology 
The data used in this study were collected for an NIJ funded project on 
environmental compliance (2001-IJ-CX-0020, Simpson & Garner, 2001).  The original 
sample consisted of a universe of public companies within the four SIC industry codes 
collected using Ward’s Business Directory (1995), Standard and Poor’s Industrial 
Compustat, and Mergent Online, formerly Financial Information System (FIS) Online. 
The companies were then located in the Directory of Corporate Affiliations and all plants, 
mills, and subsidiaries owned by that corporation were included.  These companies were 
then linked to EPA facility records.  Additional facilities and companies were added 
using the Toxic Release Inventory database maintained by the EPA and from the Permit 
Compliance System database.  
These procedures resulted in a total sample of 104 companies that own and 
operate facilities subject to OSHA regulations.  Economic data, collected from Mergent 
Online, were unavailable for nine of these companies so they were eliminated from the 
sample.  Economic data were also unavailable for four additional companies, which 
turned out to be subsidiaries of other companies in the sample; the violations of these 
four companies were counted as violations by the parent companies.  Companies with 
fewer than three years of inspection/violation data also were eliminated from the sample.  
Finally, two companies were dropped from the sample because they were consistent 
outliers.  For example, company #72 had a total violation rate of 20 compared to an 
average of 2.95, an egregious violation rate of 7.58 compared to an average of .33, and a 
serious violation rate of 11.63 compared to an average of 1.68.  Similarly, company #95 
had a total violation rate of 15.63 compared to the average of 2.95 and an egregious 
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 violation rate of 15.5 compared to the average of .33.  Dropping these companies resulted 
in a final sample of 72 companies.12  Of these 72 companies, 24 operate in the paper 
industry, 18 operate in the oil industry, 15 operate in the steel industry, and 15 operate in 
the pulp industry.  
Dependent Variables 
This study utilizes the violation data collected from the OSHA Management 
Information System (MIS), which is used by the agency to track enforcement and 
compliance and is available online.  The violations include other, serious, repeat, willful, 
and unclassified as mentioned in the OSHA section above.  OSHA violation data were 
collected at the facility level and include the reason for the inspection, the scope of the 
inspection, the type of inspection, the number and type of violations cited and the fines 
assessed.  OSHA violations were collected for all violating facilities listed under the firm 
name in OSHA’s Management Information System for the years 1990-2000.  Although 
violations are facility violations, in this study, I aggregated the OSHA violations to the 
company level because the economic data were at the company level.  Thus, all citations 
received by a company’s facilities counted as violations by that company.  The number of 
facilities owned by each company will be included as a rough proxy for the opportunity 
to commit violations.  To analyze whether profit-squeeze leads to more OSHA violations, 
total violations was operationalized as a rate of violations per inspection to capture the 
opportunity for violations given an inspection.  To determine whether profit-squeeze 
leads to more serious OSHA violations, I used three additional dependent variables.  The 
most egregious violations available to OSHA inspectors are the repeat, willful and 
                                                 
12 Analysis was conducted including the outliers trimmed to within three standard deviations of the mean.  
The inclusion of the outliers did not consistently affect financial performance variables, and so the outliers 
were dropped for the analysis reported below. 
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 unclassified violations; these are also the most rarely cited violations.  Thus, these three 
violation types were combined and counted as the egregious violations in my data.  The 
‘other’ violations cited by OSHA inspectors count as the least egregious violations, and 
serious violations are considered more serious than ‘other’ violations but not as serious as 
egregious violations.  These three variables also will be operationalized as a rate of 
violations per inspection.  The distribution of violations and the rate of violations over 
time is displayed in Table 7 (p.38).  The violations appear fairly distributed over time.  
Not surprisingly, there is a decline in total violations and an increase in egregious 
violations in the years 1995 and 1996.  As discussed previously, OSHA experienced 
threatened budget cuts during this period and shifted its attention to more egregious 
violations, which monopolize resources (Siskind, 2002).  Surprisingly, though, the fewest 
violations were cited from 1998-2000.  This is unexpected since Siskind (2002) reported 
that a recovery in the number of inspections occurred beginning in 1997.  In order to 
determine whether this change in OSHA inspections affects my results, I will run a 
second analysis and split the data into two four-year periods.         
Table 7.  Chronological Distribution of Inspections, Violations and Rate of 
Violations* 
YEAR INSPECTIONS TOTAL 
VIOLATIONS (RATE 
OF VIOLATIONS) 
EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS 
(RATE OF EGREGIOUS 
VIOLATIONS) 
1993 192 715 (4.60) 45 (.39) 
1994 242 763 (3.47) 41 (.20) 
1995 183 574 (3.70) 193 (1.85) 
1996 153 431 (3.98) 117 (1.01) 
1997 157 585 (3.32) 34 (.21) 
1998 113 227 (1.87) 12 (.09) 
1999 131 320 (2.55) 21 (.11) 
2000 133 245 (2.07) 12 (.24) 
*Serious and other violations and rates are not shown because they followed the general pattern of total 
violations and rate of total violations. 
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 Independent Variables 
Firm Level  
Economic data at the firm level were collected from Mergent Online for the years 
1993-2000 and includes current assets, total assets, total liabilities, total stockholder’s 
equity, total sales, and total net income.  Following Clinard and Yeager (1980), I use 
three measures of financial performance at the firm level.  Profitability was measured by 
dividing net income by the total sales of the firm.  Efficiency was measured by dividing a 
firm’s total sales by its assets, and liquidity was defined as “a firm’s working capital (the 
difference between current assets and current liabilities) divided by total corporate assets” 
(Clinard & Yeager, 1980, p. 128).  These three ratios measure different aspects of firm 
performance and are commonly used by corporate officials to assess firm performance 
(Clinard & Yeager, 1980).  Also following Clinard and Yeager (1980), I include three 
variables measuring the eight-year trend in financial improvement or decline over the 
period 1993-2000.  I created these variables by regressing each financial performance 
variable over time for each company; the coefficients from the regressions became the 
trend variables.  Whereas profitability, efficiency, and liquidity allow me to determine 
whether a company with better financial performance commits fewer violations, these 
trend variables for profitability, efficiency, and liquidity allow me to determine whether a 
company experiencing increasing financial performance over the eight-year period 
commits fewer violations.  In other words, these trend variables allow for a more direct 
test of the profit-squeeze and crime relationship.  (These variables along with those 
discussed below are displayed in Table 8 (p.43)).    
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 Prior violation data were collected from the OSHA MIS for the years 1990-1992.  
Prior violations were totaled for each company, and the data were used to create a 
dummy variable.  In the analyses to follow, zero represents no violations and one 
represents one or more violations.  
Industry Level Variables 
Originally, I intended to include variables to measure industry profitability and 
concentration; however, the averaging of the data over the eight-year period resulted in 
the loss of variation in these variables since I am only examining firms in four industries.  
Thus, I rely on dummy variables for industry membership.  I used paper as the omitted 
category in the initial analyses, and then I tested for significant differences between the 
other industry groups. 
Control Variables  
Firm Level Variables 
The OSHA literature provides some information on control variables that are 
relevant to this study.  For example, many of the studies provide characteristics of firms 
that are inspected more heavily by OSHA.  Using these variables, I can attempt to control 
for the enforcement activity of OSHA.  Many of these studies concluded that large firms 
are more likely to be inspected than small firms (Weil, 1996, Scholz & Gray, 1990, 
Gleason & Barnum, 1976, Weil, 1991).  Further, Scherer et al. (1993) found that OSHA 
inspectors spent more time onsite during inspections in larger firms than in smaller ones, 
and inspectors cited more violations in larger firms than smaller firms.  The authors 
concluded that larger firms were at a disadvantage when it came to probability of being 
inspected and cited.  However, larger firms were able to negotiate better penalty 
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 reductions than smaller firms, and so larger firms have the advantage when it comes to 
bargaining power and penalty amounts.  Since larger firms tend to be inspected more than 
smaller firms, I controlled for the size of the company.  Company size was measured as 
the average number of employees in the company for the eight-year study period.  This 
measurement has been used in the corporate crime literature (McKendall, 1999, 2002) 
and in the OSHA literature (Ruser & Smith, 1990).  Most studies of OSHA inspections 
measure firm size using number of employees because the nonrandom programmed 
inspections are primarily based on observable factors, such as the industry and 
employment size (Gray & Jones, 1991).  The number of employees in a company was 
obtained from Mergent Online. 
Union membership is another variable I included in my analysis in order to 
control for the enforcement activity of OSHA.  As mentioned earlier, employees have the 
ability to initiate an inspection through a complaint and the ability to influence the 
outcome of the inspection by accompanying the inspector on the inspection (Weil, 1991).  
According to Weil (1991), employees of unionized firms tend to participate in the 
inspection process at much higher rates than employees of nonunionized firms.  
Consequently, Weil (1991) found that a higher number of violations and penalties were 
cited in unionized firms versus comparable nonunion establishments.  Also, Bartel and 
Thomas (1985) found that OSHA inspectors targeted nonunion firms in order to impose 
costs on nonunion competitors of union firms.  Therefore, I include the union 
membership measure in my analysis in order to try and capture the extra influence 
exerted by union members on OSHA enforcement.  Union membership was collected 
from the OSHA MIS along with the rest of the violation data.  However, this measure, 
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 like the violations, is provided at the facility level.  Thus, I aggregated this measure up to 
the company level by operationalizing it as the percentage of the company’s inspected 
facilities that were unionized.     
Another control variable I include in my analysis is for inspections conducted by 
Fed OSHA.  As I mentioned, 21 states had their own state plans and were not inspected 
by Fed OSHA but by their own state inspectors.  I include inspections conducted and 
violations cited by both state and Fed OSHA inspector and control for the difference 
using the percentage of inspections for each company that were conducted by Fed OSHA.  
I also used the number of facilities owned by a firm as a control variable in my 
analysis.  Including this variable in my data allowed me to control for the opportunity of 
a firm to violate an OSHA regulation.  For example, it implies something different if 
company A has 10 facilities and 50 violations and company B has 2 facilities and 50 
violations.  This means that company A’s facilities are generating about five violations 
each while company B’s facilities are generating 25 violations each.  Alternatively, if 
Company A has 250 violations instead of 50, then each facility would generate the same 
number of violations as in company B.  I collected the number of facilities owned by a 
firm for each of the eight years during the study period (when available).  I gathered the 
data using the companies’ 10-K reports, which are available online from Mergent Online.  
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 Table 8.  Descriptives of Variables, Averaged for Years 1993-2000 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Total violations (Total 
violations/inspections) 
2.948 2.154 0 8.938 
Egregious violations 
(Egregious 
violations/inspections) 
0.328 1.052 0 7.667 
Serious violations (Serious 
violations/inspections) 
1.680 1.376 0 7.483 
Other violations (Other 
violations/inspections) 
0.912 0.877 0 3.667 
Profitability (Net 
income/Total sales) 
0.025 0.035 -0.067 0.113 
Profitability Trend (Slope of 
Profitability over time) 
0.001 0.018 -0.081 0.074 
Efficiency (Total sales/Total 
assets) 
1.048 0.439 0 2.709 
Efficiency Trend (Slope of 
Efficiency over time) 
0.016 0.082 -0.133 0.390 
Liquidity ((Current assets – 
current liabilities)/Total 
assets) 
0.079 0.085 -0.093 0.342 
Liquidity Trend (Slope of 
Liquidity over time) 
-0.003 0.018 -0.110 0.023 
Prior violations  
(0=none, 1=one or more) 
0.716 0.454 0 1 
Firm size (Average number of 
employees) 
19,142.
31 
18,413.89 441.875 82,833.33 
 
Union membership (Percent 
of inspected facilities 
represented by a union) 
0.870 0.235 0 1 
Fed OSHA (Percent of 
inspected facilities covered by 
Federal OSHA) 
0.487 0.378 0 1 
Facilities (Number of 
facilities) 
6.684 5.836 1 27.286 
Pulp (1=pulp, 0=not pulp) 0.216 0.415 0 1 
Steel (1=steel, 0=not steel) 0.203 0.405 0 1 
Oil (1=oil, 0=not oil) 0.243 0.432 0 1 
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 Statistical Procedure 
Since my dependent variables are calculated as rates, they are truncated at zero.  
Therefore, I employed a TOBIT regression model in my analysis.  In order to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity problems in my data, I ended up using a variation of a TOBIT 
regression that allows for such adjustments.  Like OLS, TOBIT regressions use 
maximum likelihood estimation.  The difference is that with TOBIT, the likelihood 
function is composed of two parts: the observations where the variable is censored at 
zero, and the observations where the dependent variable is positive.  Once the likelihood 
function is defined correctly, traditional techniques are used to maximize the likelihood 
function and to find the estimates for the coefficients (McKendall et al., 1999). 
For the initial analysis, I averaged all eight years of data.  The disadvantage of 
this is that I lost the variation in the industry variables and so I had to rely on the dummy 
variables for industry membership (paper is the omitted industry in the reported 
analyses).  In order to test my second hypothesis, I ran the initial analysis without the 
dummy variables and then with the dummy variables to determine whether the 
significance of the financial performance variables was attenuated by controlling for 
industry.  I also split the data into two four-year periods in order to determine whether the 
declines in OSHA enforcement that occurred in 1995-1996 and from 1998-2000 affected 
the results of the analysis with all eight years of data.  This split will also allow me to test 
the robustness of my findings in the models for the full eight-year period and determine 
whether there are any short-term financial performance trends that could not be detected 
in the models for the full eight years. 
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 I noted earlier that the pulp and paper industries are closely interconnected.  Pulp 
facilities produce pulp, which is used in the production of paper.  Further, the majority of 
facilities in these two industries operate as both pulp and paper facilities or as paper-only 
facilities (SNP Pulp and Paper, 1995).  Therefore, I wanted to determine if the models 
provided a better fit with the data when the pulp and paper industries were combined.  I 
performed a likelihood ratio test to determine if including pulp in the models provided an 
improvement over the models with pulp and paper combined as one industry.  In all but 
one of the models, I rejected the null hypothesis and determined that adding pulp as a 
separate industry provided a significant improvement over combining the two industries.  
Thus, results are reported for the models with all four industries included, and I discuss 
the results from the analysis using the three industries only for the model (rate of 
egregious violations for years 1997-2000) where the null hypothesis of equivalence could 
not be rejected. 
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 Chapter IV - Results and Discussion 
Bivariate Results 
The correlation coefficients for all the variables in the model are reported in Table 
9 (p. 48).  The results show that profitability is inversely related, though not significantly 
related, to total violations (r = -.040) and egregious violations (r = -.181) but positively 
related to serious violations (r = .035) and other violations (r = .091).  Efficiency is 
inversely related to egregious violations (r = -.022) positively related to total violations (r 
= .111) serious violations (r = .046) and other violations (r = .067).  Liquidity is inversely 
related to egregious violations (r = -.081) but positively related to total violations (r = 
.070), serious violations (r = .111) and other violations (r = .112).  Priors are also 
positively, though not significantly, related to all violation types.  Union membership is 
inversely related to total violations (r = -.095), serious violations (r = -.212) and other 
violations (r = -.087) and positively related to egregious violations (r = .139).  None of 
the relationships between industry membership variables and violations are significant, 
but membership in the pulp industry is inversely related to all violation types except for 
serious violations while membership in the steel industry is inversely related to all 
violation types except for egregious violations.  Finally, membership in the oil industry is 
inversely related to total and other violations but positively related to egregious and 
serious violations.   
The correlations for number of facilities and size (r = .613) were quite high and 
significant, but they are being used as controls and so not a huge cause for concern.  
However, the coefficients for efficiency and the dummy for oil (r = .563) and liquidity 
and the dummy for steel (r = .655) were also quite high and relevant to hypotheses so it is 
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  47
important to note possible multicollinearity in my results concerning these four variables.  
To assess whether multicollinearity affects key independent variables of interest, I plan to 
run separate analyses for theoretically relevant sets of variables.  Since bivariate results 
can be spurious, I now turn to multivariate analyses to investigate whether these reported 
relationships hold. 
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Table 9.  Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables (N=72) +
+Violation variables shown are calculated as violations per inspection 
Profitability Efficiency Liquidity Number
of 
facilities 
 Size Fed
OSHA 
Union Pulp Steel Oil Priors
Profitability           1  
Efficiency            
            
           
-0.100 1
Liquidity -0.041  0.102 1
Number of 
facilities 
-0.013 -0.225 -0.283* 1
Size  0.246* -0.112 -0.509**  0.613** 1       
Fed OSHA -0.269*  0.001  0.107  0.019 -0.062 1      
Union -0.147 -0.164 -0.133  0.075  0.113  0.142 1     
Pulp  0.103 -0.245* -0.135  0.107  0.180 -0.174  0.129 1    
Steel -0.161  0.045  0.655** -0.163 -0.285*  0.227 -0.024 -0.265* 1   
Oil  0.023  0.563** -0.345* -0.239*  0.072  0.007 -0.181 -0.298** -0.286* 1  
Priors -0.155  0.071  0.016  0.049  0.073  0.230*  0.040 -0.325**  0.168  0.147 1 
Total 
violations 
 
-0.040 
  
 0.111 
  
0.070 
 
-0.163 
 
-0.221 
 
 0.230* 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.094 
 
-0.024 
 
0.081 
Egregious 
violations 
 
-0.181 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.126 
 
-0.122 
 
 0.227 
 
 0.139 
 
-0.102 
 
 0.134 
 
 0.131 
 
0.165 
Serious 
violations 
 
 0.035 
 
 0.046 
 
 0.111 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.205 
 
 0.220 
 
-0.212 
 
 0.245 
 
-0.131 
 
 0.006 
 
0.020 
Other 
violations 
 
 0.091 
 
 0.067 
 
 0.112 
 
-0.064 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.171 
 
-0.195 
 
0.020 
Mean  0.024  1.048  0.079  6.684 19142.31  0.487  0.870  0.216  0.202  0.243  0.716 
STD Dev.  0.035  0.439  0.085  5.836 18413.89  0.378  0.235  0.414  0.405  0.432  0.454 
 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
(Two-tail test)
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TOBIT Regression Results 
The results of the models for all eight years of data are reported in Table 10 
(p.50).  The trend variables measuring financial improvement or decline over the eight-
year period were dropped from these models because they were not significant, and I had 
concerns about the number of variables in my models given the number of cases in my 
sample.13  TOBIT procedures do not produce an R2 statistic so I calculated a McFadden’s 
pseudo R2, which is calculated by dividing the constrained likelihood function by the 
unconstrained likelihood function and then subtracting the result from one.  Compared to 
the standard R2, the pseudo R2 significantly understates the amount of variance explained 
by the model (McKendall & Wagner, 1997).  Thus, the pseudo R2 that are displayed in 
Table 10 appear small.  TOBIT procedures produce a Wald chi-squared test that assesses 
whether the relationships in the model are attributable to chance; this is also reported in 
Table 10 (p. 50).  The Wald chi-squared test was significant for all the models except for 
egregious violations, suggesting that the relationships in that model may be due to 
chance.
                                                 
13 It could be that the trend variables are not significant in the full models because companies do not have 
long-term patterns of financial improvement or decline or long-term patterns do not influence decisions to 
violate regulations.  Therefore, I include the trend variables in the models for the two four-year periods 
since companies may exhibit more short-terms patterns of financial improvement or decline that influence 
illegal behavior. 
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Table 10. TOBIT Analysis, 1993-2000 (N=72) 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (One-tail test)
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
RATE OF 
TOTAL 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
TOTAL 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
Profitability   7.0102
(0.113) 
 5.684     
(0.092) 
-3.183 
(0.105) 
-1.632    
(0.054) 
 6.694 
(0.169) 
 5.539     
(0.140) 
4.864 
(0.193) 
 4.520 
(0.179) 
Efficiency   0.740
(0.151) 
 1.605*   
(0.327) 
-0.038 
(0.016) 
-0.138    
(0.057) 
 0.669 
(0.213) 
 1.249*   
(0.398) 
0.405+
(0.202) 
 1.065** 
(0.533) 
Liquidity  -1.741
(0.069) 
-0.928     
(0.037) 
-4.453 
(0.361) 
-7.314    
(0.592) 
-0.511 
(0.032) 
 0.728     
(0.045) 
2.139 
(0.225) 
 2.215 
(0.215) 
Number of 
Facilities 
 0.012 
(0.033) 
-0.041     
(0.111) 
 0.015 
(0.084) 
 0.013    
(0.070) 
-0.009 
(0.040) 
-0.057*   
(0.244) 
0.010 
(0.066) 
-0.024 
(0.156) 
Priors   0.123
(0.026) 
 0.338     
(0.071) 
 1.052 
(0.454) 
 0.840+     
(0.362) 
-0.059 
(0.020) 
 0.056     
(0.018) 
0.104 
(0.054) 
 0.298 
(0.154) 
Fed OSHA  1.341+  
(0.235) 
 1.639*   
(0.287) 
 0.973 
(0.349) 
 0.941+   
 (0.338) 
 1.018* 
(0.280) 
 1.258** 
(0.345) 
0.125 
(0.054) 
 0.347 
(0.149) 
Union  -0.0169
(0.002) 
-0.498     
(0.054) 
 1.020 
(0.228) 
 1.079+    
(0.241) 
-0.670 
(0.114) 
-1.007     
(0.172) 
0.342 
(0.092) 
-0.026 
(0.007) 
Size -0.00004* -0.00003* 
(0.287)   (0.365) 
-0.00004 
(0.621) 
-0.00003+    
(0.572) 
-0.00002+ 
(0.268) 
-0.00001 
(0.135) 
-.000005 
(0.105) 
-0.0000009 
(0.019) 
Pulp     -1.105+    
(0.213) 
 -0.636    
(0.251)    
-1.192**
(0.359) 
 -0.473
(0.224) 
Steel     -2.083**
(0.392) 
   0.827    
(0.318) 
-1.783**
(0.524) 
 -1.255**
(0.579) 
Oil     -2.309**
(0.463) 
   0.066    
(0.027) 
-1.765**
(0.554) 
 -1.576**
(0.776) 
   Pseudo R2  0.041  0.085  0.124  0.155  0.069  0.179  0.033  0.181 
   Wald chi2 20.31** 31.80**  7.81  9.19 21.75**    35.82**  7.72 38.43**
 
  
The hypothesized relationship between firm profit-squeeze and crime is not truly 
tested in these full models since the data was aggregated and the financial trend variables, 
which measure whether a firm was experiencing declining profits over the eight-year 
period, are dropped.  As stated before, these trend variables were dropped from the full 
models because they were not significant and I was concerned about the number of 
variables in the models given the small number of companies in my sample.  However, 
the results can show whether firms with lower levels of profitability, efficiency, and 
liquidity commit more violations.  The first model actually shows that efficiency was the 
only financial performance variable to significantly predict more total violations, and it is 
in the opposite direction than hypothesized; more efficient firms were significantly more 
likely to commit more total violations (p<0.05).  Further, efficiency produces one of the 
stronger effects on total violations according to the standardized Beta (.327).  Similarly, 
profitability is positive but insignificantly related to total OSHA violations.  Only 
liquidity was in the hypothesized direction, but it was not significant.  These data do not 
support my second hypothesis that controlling for industry would attenuate profit-squeeze 
at the firm level.  None of the financial performance variables are significant in the model 
without industry dummy variables, and the impact of the variables on violations was not 
greatly affected by adding the dummy variables to the analysis except for the impact of 
efficiency, which actually increased from B=.151 to B=.327 when the dummy variables 
were added.  However, industry variables are significant, and the standardized betas show 
that membership in the steel (B=.392) and oil (B=.463) industry produce the greatest 
effect on rate of total violations.  Firms in the oil industry were significantly (p<0.01) less 
likely to commit OSHA violations than firms in the paper industry.  I tested for 
 51
 significant differences between the other groups, and firms in the oil industry were 
significantly less likely to commit violations than firms in the pulp industry as well.  
Firms in the pulp industry were significantly less likely to commit violations (p<0.1) than 
firms in the paper industry, but significantly more likely to commit violations (p<0.1) 
than firms in the oil industry, according to subsequent tests of significance between the 
industry groups.  Also, firms in the steel industry were significantly less likely to commit 
total violations (p<0.01) compared to firms in the paper industry.  Finally, regarding the 
last hypothesis, firms with prior violations were more likely, though not significantly 
more likely, to commit total OSHA violations.  A quick look at the control variables 
shows that firms covered by Fed OSHA were significantly more likely to commit 
violations (p<0.05) and unionized firms were less likely, but not significantly so, to 
commit serious violations.  Size and number of facilities had negative effects on 
violations, though only size was significant (p<0.05). 
For the second model, it should be noted that the Wald chi-squared test showed 
the results could not be distinguished from relationships that would occur by chance, 
making these results less reliable than those from other models.  With this in mind, these 
results should be interpreted cautiously.  The coefficients for all three financial 
performance variables in this model are in the hypothesized direction, showing that more 
profitable and efficient firms and firms with more liquidity are less likely to commit 
egregious OSHA violations.  While none of these variables are significant predictors of 
egregious violations, it is interesting to note that liquidity exerts the greatest effect on 
egregious violations, according to the standardized Beta (.592).  The second hypothesis is 
also not supported by the results in this model.  Once again, none of the financial 
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 performance variables are significant in the model without dummy variables.  The impact 
of profitability is reduced by half in this model, but the impact of both efficiency and 
liquidity increases when the dummy variables are added.  While none of the dummies for 
industry membership are significant, the results show that firms in the oil industry are 
more likely than firms in the paper and pulp industry to commit egregious violations.  
Firms in the pulp industry committed the fewest egregious violations, although, like all of 
the industry variables, this finding was not significant.  There is now evidence, though it 
is weak given the Wald chi-squared results for this model, that firms with prior violations 
are significantly more likely to commit egregious violations (p<0.1).  Firms covered by 
Fed OSHA were, again, significantly more likely to commit violations (p<0.1).  
Interestingly, in this model, unionized firms were significantly more likely to commit 
egregious violations (p<0.1), although the size of this effect is modest with a standardized 
Beta of .241.  In this model, priors had a larger impact on egregious violations than being 
covered by Fed OSHA and unionization but had a smaller impact than size; size (B=.572) 
had the second largest impact on egregious violations.  Larger firms were less likely to 
commit these types of offenses.   
Contradicting the first hypothesis, the results from the third full model show that 
firms with greater efficiency commit more serious violations (p<0.05).  And efficiency 
(B=.398) had the greatest impact on serious violations with the exception of the industry 
membership variables.  Once again, the second hypothesis was not supported; none of the 
financial performance variables are significant without the dummy variables.  The only 
effect that is attenuated is that of profitability, but this is a very minimal change from 
B=.169 to B=.140.  Despite the lack of support for hypothesis two, the industry dummy 
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 variables are significant and exerted the largest effect on serious violations according to 
the standardized Betas.  Firms in the oil, steel, and pulp industries commit fewer serious 
violations than firms in the paper industry.  Subsequent tests showed that the dummy for 
pulp was not significantly different from steel or oil.  Finally, in support of the last 
hypothesis, firms with prior violations were more likely, though not significantly more 
likely, to commit serious violations.  Firms covered by Fed OSHA were significantly 
more likely to commit serious violations (p<0.01), and this was once again one of the 
more important variables in the analysis according to the standardized coefficient.  The 
union coefficient in this model returned to being negatively, but not significantly, related 
to violations. 
The results of the final full model show that, once again, efficiency is positively 
related to violations; more efficient firms are significantly more likely to commit the least 
serious OSHA violations (p<0.01).  The magnitude of this effect is high (B=.533), 
although not as high as the effect of the industry membership variables.  The data show 
no support for the second hypothesis.  The only financial performance variable that is 
significant in the model without the industry dummy variables is efficiency, and the 
impact of efficiency increases when the dummy variables are added.  The impact of both 
profitability and liquidity does decrease slightly, but neither variable is significant.  Once 
again, the industry dummy variables are highly significant.  Firms in the steel and oil 
industries are significantly less likely to commit other OSHA violations than firms in the 
paper industry (p<0.01).  Further analysis showed that firms in the oil industry were also 
significantly less likely to commit other OSHA violations than firms in the pulp industry, 
but oil was not significantly different from steel.  Subsequent significance tests showed 
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 that pulp was significantly more likely to commit other violations than firms in the steel 
(p<0.1) and oil (p<0.01) industries.  Membership in the oil industry had the largest 
impact on other violations with a standardized Beta of .776.  Hypothesis three receives 
weak support; firms with prior violations are more likely, though not significantly more 
likely, to commit the least serious OSHA violations, and the effect of priors is not large 
according to the standardized Beta.  Being covered by Fed OSHA is again positively 
related to violations and union members are again less likely to commit violations, 
although this time neither finding is significant nor do they exert a large impact on other 
violations.14
In summary, the results from the full models covering all eight years, showed 
little support for the research hypotheses.  As mentioned previously, these models do not 
directly test the profit-squeeze and crime relationship because the data are aggregated and 
the trend variables are dropped from the models.  However, the results indicate that, 
contrary to the rationale of a profit-squeeze and crime argument, firms with more 
efficiency appear significantly more likely to commit total, serious, and other OSHA 
violations.  The second hypothesis also received no support, although the industry 
variables were significant in three of the four models.  The final hypothesis, that firms 
with prior violations would commit more and more serious violations, was directionally 
supported in the four models, although the coefficient was only significant for egregious 
                                                 
14 Because the results from the multivariate analysis tended to differ from those in the bivariate analyses, I 
had concerns about multicollinearity.  Thus, I ran the analysis with theoretically coherent measures 
analyzed together in smaller groups.  On the whole, the coefficients remained in the same direction as 
reported in the full model.  The exceptions were that profitability became negatively, although not 
significantly, related to total violations, priors became negatively related to serious violations, and being 
covered by Federal OSHA became negatively relate to other violations.  Aside from these few differences, 
the results were consistent with those reported.     
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violations.  The most consistent and significant finding was that firms covered by Fed 
OSHA commit more and more serious violations.15        
The results of the second analysis, which includes averaged data for each 
company for the first four years of the sample period, 1993-1996, are presented in Table 
11 (p.57).  In these models, I explore the robustness of the results from the full models, 
and I include the financial performance trend variables to determine whether there are 
short-term financial patterns of improvement or decline that affect corporate violations of 
OSHA.  I expect to find that there are more short-term patterns in financial performance 
so the financial performance trend variables should be significant in these models. 
However, the addition of the trend variables makes the number of variables in my  
analysis (14) very high compared to the number of cases in my sample (60).16  Thus, the 
analysis is exploratory and the results should be interpreted with that in mind.  Table 11 
(p.57) shows that the relationships in the regression for egregious violations are again 
likely attributable to chance.
 
15 To further explore these results, I ran these same models replacing Clinard and Yeager’s (1980) measure 
of profitability with the one used by Keane (1993).  Keane (1993) calculated profitability as net income 
divided by total assets.  These results are not shown because they were almost identical to those reported 
above.  The only difference was that union membership was significantly and negatively related to serious 
OSHA violations (p<0.05) and number of facilities was significantly and negatively related to other OSHA 
violations (p<0.1)  
16 The sample size was reduced for the two four-year periods from 72 to 60 because there were several 
companies that either ceased to exist in the 1997-2000 period or companies that did not exist until the 
1997-2000 period.  Further, some companies received all of their violations in one period or the other and 
so were eliminated from the period in which no violations were received.      
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INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
RATE OF 
TOTAL OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
TOTAL OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
Profitability  15.073
(0.239) 
13.885 
(0.220) 
 1.114 
(0.031) 
 0.669 
(0.019) 
12.649 
(0.340) 
11.625 
(0.312) 
0.760 
(0.031) 
 0.667 
(0.028) 
Profitability Trend  9.153 
(0.112) 
 4.970 
(0.061) 
-1.877 
(0.041) 
-3.248 
(0.071) 
12.148 
(0.251) 
 9.717 
(0.200) 
-2.542 
(0.081) 
-4.595 
(0.147) 
Efficiency  -0.336
(0.054) 
 0.719 
(0.115) 
-0.952 
(0.270) 
-0.503 
(0.142)  
 0.272 
(0.073) 
 0.782 
(0.211) 
0.146 
(0.061) 
 0.746* 
(0.311) 
Efficiency Trend  5.204 
(0.230) 
 7.687 
(0.339) 
 6.212 
(0.486) 
 6.198 
(0.485) 
-1.417 
(0.106) 
 0.040 
(0.003) 
-1.130 
(0.130) 
 0.341 
(0.039) 
Liquidity   5.706
(0.190) 
 8.150 
(0.271) 
 0.456 
(0.027) 
-5.329 
(0.315) 
-0.323 
(0.018) 
 2.896 
(0.163) 
1.986 
(0.173) 
 2.590 
(0.225) 
Liquidity Trend -26.280 
(0.217) 
-30.094 
(0.249) 
-13.828 
(0.203) 
-11.231 
(0.165) 
-6.541 
(0.091) 
-7.654 
(0.107) 
-5.738 
(0.124) 
-9.153+ 
(0.198) 
Number of 
Facilities 
-0.039 
(0.073) 
-0.161* 
(0.303) 
-0.020 
(0.068)  
-0.058 
(0.192) 
-0.036 
(0.113) 
-0.102* 
(0.325) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
-0.056+ 
(0.276) 
Priors  -1.260
(0.188) 
-0.804 
(0.120) 
 1.521+ 
(0.402) 
 1.403 
(0.371) 
-0.860 
(0.216) 
-0.613 
(0.154) 
-0.668 
(0.260) 
-0.404 
(0.157) 
Fed OSHA  0.879 
(0.119) 
 1.423 
(0.193) 
 1.110 
(0.266) 
 1.126 
(0.270) 
 0.771 
(0.176) 
 1.103+ 
(0.252) 
-0.082 
(0.029) 
 0.235 
(0.083) 
Union  -0.343
(0.034) 
-1.419 
(0.140) 
 1.381 
(0.242) 
 1.493 
(0.262) 
-1.144 
(0.191) 
-1.656** 
(0.277) 
-0.305 
(0.079) 
-0.944* 
(0.244) 
Size -0.000003  0.00002 
(0.018) (0.155) 
-0.00002 
(0.203) 
-0.00002 
(0.177) 
-0.000004 
(0.043) 
-0.00001 
(0.145) 
.000003 
(0.050) 
-0.00002+ 
(0.267) 
Pulp         -1.374
(0.194) 
-1.052
(0.264) 
-1.249*
(0.298) 
-0.306
(0.113) 
Steel         -3.122**
(0.463) 
0.568
(0.150) 
-2.291** 
(0.574) 
-1.353**
(0.524) 
Oil        -3.671**
(0.567) 
-1.116
(0.306) 
-2.040** 
(0.532) 
-1.923**
(0.775) 
   Pseudo R2  0.041  0.098  0.116  0.135  0.060  0.163  0.048  0.189 
   Wald chi2 10.16  24.66*  7.57  9.68     28.38** 43.87**  9.68 29.26**
Table 11. TOBIT Analysis, 1993-1996 (N=60) (+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01) (One-tail test) 
 As shown in Table 11 (p.57), the first hypothesis receives partial support.  Only 
one financial trend variable is significant; firms experiencing an increase in liquidity over 
the four-year period have significantly fewer other violations (p<0.1), although the 
magnitude of this finding is not very strong (B=.198).  The liquidity trend variable is also 
negatively related to total, egregious, and serious violations.  Although the effect is fairly 
strong in the first model (B=.249), it is not significant or large in magnitude in any of the 
other models.  The profitability trend variable is also in the hypothesized direction, 
although not significant, for egregious and other violations.  However, as in the full 
models, more efficient firms are more likely to commit total and serious violations and 
significantly more likely to commit other violations (p<0.05) according to the results in 
Table 11 (p. 57).  The magnitude of the effect of efficiency on other violations is 
moderate (B=.311) although not as strong as the effect of the industry dummy variables.  
The second hypothesis, as in the full models, receives little support.  The financial 
performance variables were not significant in the models without the dummy variables, 
and once again, the impact of the variables on violations was not consistent.  For 
instance, the magnitude of all the financial performance variables, except for profitability 
and profitability trend, increases for total violations.  Similarly, for egregious violations, 
the magnitude of all the financial performance variables except for profitability trend and 
liquidity decreases.  The magnitude of the profitability variable is attenuated in all models 
by adding the dummy variables, while the magnitude of the liquidity variable is increased 
in all models.  These very inconsistent results do not lend strong support to the second 
hypothesis.  However, the industry membership variables for steel and oil are once again 
significant and exhibit the strongest effects in all four models according to the 
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 standardized betas.  Firms in the oil and steel industries are significantly less likely to 
commit total violations (p<0.01), serious violations (p<0.01) and other violations 
(p<0.01) than firms in the paper industry.  Later analysis revealed that firms in the oil 
industry were also significantly less likely to commit total violations (p<0.05) and other 
violations (p<0.01) than firms in the pulp industry.  Firms in the pulp industry were 
significantly less likely to violate serious violations (p<0.05) than firms in the paper 
industry, but were more likely to violate serious violations (p<0.1) than firms in the steel 
industry, according to subsequent tests of significance between industry groups.  The data 
from these models also do not support the last hypothesis.  Firms with priors actually 
committed fewer total, serious, and other violations, although these results were not 
significant.  Priors were related to more egregious violations and the magnitude is one of 
the largest reported in that model (B=.371), but this result also failed to gain significance.  
Being covered by Fed OSHA is still related to more violations but only significantly 
related to more serious violations.  Firms with more facilities commit fewer total, serious, 
and other violations in these models, although this is only a moderate effect compared to 
other variables in the models.  Finally, union membership is significantly and negatively 
related to serious and other violations, and according to the standardized Betas, these are 
moderate effects. 
The models for the first four-years seem to support the general findings of the full 
models.  Also, by including the financial performance trend variables, I was able to 
explore whether short-term patterns of financial performance affected OSHA violations.  
These data show that in the first four years, firms experiencing improved liquidity were 
less likely to commit other OSHA violations.  However, the magnitude of this effect was 
 59
  60
                                                
weak.  Also, it should be noted again that the same concern I had about adding these 
trend variables to the full models is still present in these partial models so the analysis of 
these models should be considered exploratory and the results should be interpreted 
carefully.17      
The Tobit results for the averaged data for the years 1997-2000 are displayed in 
Table 12 (p.61).  I include the financial performance trend variables in this analysis as 
well.  This analysis, like the one for the years 1993-1996, is exploratory; by adding the 
trend variables, I increase the number of variables in the analysis, which is a cause for 
concern given the sample size.  Thus, the results should be interpreted with this in mind.  
In this model, it is the relationships in the regression for rate of serious violations that 
may be attributable to chance.  The explained variance increased from the variance 
explained by the full models and the models for 1993-1996 with the exception of rate of 
serious violations, which suggests that the models do a better job of explaining the 
relationships in the last four years of data.  
 
17 Once again, I reran these regressions using Keane’s (1993) measure of profitability.  Once again, the 
results were identical for serious and other violations.  However, there were some differences for total 
violations and egregious violations.  For total violations, profitability was significantly and positively 
related to violations (p<0.1).  The trend for efficiency was also positively and significantly related to 
violations while the trend for liquidity was significantly and negatively related to violations.  These 
changes add to the mixed support for the first hypothesis.  For the egregious violations, the coefficients for 
priors (p<0.05) and Fed OSHA (p<0.1) gained significance. 
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Table 12. TOBIT Analysis, 1997-2000 (N=60) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
RATE OF 
TOTAL 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
TOTAL 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
EGREGIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
SERIOUS 
OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
WITHOUT 
DUMMIES 
(STD. BETA) 
RATE OF 
OTHER OSHA 
VIOLATIONS 
(STD. BETA) 
Profitability 6.286 
(0.070) 
 1.840 
(0.021) 
-2.100 
(0.329) 
-0.225 
(0.035) 
 4.440 
(0.062) 
 1.293 
(0.018) 
0.543 
(0.025) 
-1.042 
(0.047) 
Profitability 
Trend 
17.072 
(0.117) 
 6.930 
(0.048) 
 7.153 
(0.687) 
 6.962** 
(0.669) 
 2.653 
(0.023) 
-4.293 
(0.037) 
8.844 
(0.246) 
 4.644 
(0.129) 
Efficiency 5.155+
(0.550) 
 7.130* 
(0.761) 
 0.660** 
(0.987) 
 0.689** 
(1.030) 
 3.641 
(0.486) 
 5.028+ 
(0.671) 
1.368* 
(0.591) 
 1.761** 
(0.761) 
Efficiency Trend -5.876 
(0.032) 
-7.180 
(0.284) 
-1.001* 
(0.075) 
-0.858** 
(0.475) 
-4.650 
(0.031) 
-5.588 
(0.276) 
0.307 
(0.007) 
-0.079 
(0.013) 
Liquidity  7.492
(0.145) 
10.214+ 
(0.198) 
 1.281 
(0.347) 
-0.524 
(0.142) 
 4.149 
(0.100) 
 6.357 
(0.154) 
5.778 
(0.453) 
 7.464+ 
(0.585) 
Liquidity Trend -23.167** 
(0.430) 
-19.664* 
(0.365) 
-2.143* 
(0.558) 
-1.422+ 
(0.370) 
-15.730* 
(0.365) 
-13.375+ 
(0.310) 
-8.777+ 
(0.660) 
-8.124+ 
(0.611) 
Number of 
Facilities 
0.051 
(0.067) 
 0.035 
(0.046) 
 0.036** 
(0.661) 
 0.032* 
(5.843) 
 0.017 
(0.028) 
 0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.033 
(0.175) 
 0.015 
(0.081) 
Priors  1.186
(0.123) 
 1.995+ 
(0.207) 
 0.216 
(0.313) 
 0.300* 
(0.436) 
 1.044 
(0.135) 
 1.619 
(0.210) 
0.366 
(0.154) 
 0.608 
(0.255) 
Fed OSHA 1.484 
(0.138) 
 1.717 
(0.159) 
 0.176 
(0.228) 
 0.195 
(0.253) 
 1.525 
(0.177) 
 1.651 
(0.191) 
-0.342 
(0.129) 
-0.301 
(0.113) 
Union  2.494
(0.154) 
 2.140 
(0.132) 
 0.740** 
(0.640) 
 0.673* 
(0.583) 
 1.622 
(0.125) 
 1.356 
(0.105) 
1.222 
(0.306) 
 1.020 
(0.255) 
Size -0.00005 -0.00005* 
(0.222) (0.249) 
-0.00001** 
(0.832) 
-0.00001** 
(0.790) 
-.00004 
(0.219) 
-0.00004 
(0.231) 
0.0000005 
(0.009) 
-0.000002 
(0.039) 
Pulp          -0.051
(0.005) 
------ -0.311
(0.037) 
-0.388
(0.151) 
Steel          -3.977*
(0.345) 
0.422*
(0.513) 
-2.997*
(0.325) 
-1.543*
(0.542) 
Oil       -3.675*
(0.359) 
-0.252
(0.344) 
 -2.697+ 
(0.329) 
-1.051
(0.415) 
   Pseudo R2  0.095  0.126  0.534  0.407  0.084  0.108  0.132  0.207 
   Wald chi2 15.69        28.18* 66.68** 132.97**  9.51 13.71 24.19* 33.35**
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (One-tail test)
 Unlike earlier analyses, these models show stronger economic relationships with 
offending.  However, the findings are equivocal as to the direction of the relationship.  In 
support of hypothesis one, the efficiency trend variable is significantly and negatively 
related to egregious violations (p<0.01), and the magnitude of this effect is moderate.  
The liquidity trend variable is negatively and significantly related to total (p<0.05), 
egregious (p<0.1), serious (p<0.1), and other violations (p<0.1); so firms with improving 
liquidity commit fewer of all types of OSHA violations.  The magnitude of the effect of 
liquidity is moderately strong on total (B=.365), egregious (B=.370), and serious 
(B=.310) violations, and it exerts a large effect on other OSHA violations (B=.611).  On 
the other hand, the profitability trend variable is not consistent with hypothesis one; it is 
positively and significantly related to egregious violations (p<0.01), and the magnitude of 
this effect is high according to the standardized Betas (.669).  Also, efficiency is 
significantly and strongly positively related to all violations types and liquidity is 
significantly and positively related to total and other violations (p<0.1).  The second 
hypothesis receives some support from these models.  In the initial analysis without the 
industry dummy variables, the liquidity trend variables were significant, and the 
magnitude of the effect of these variables was higher than in the final models.  For 
instance, for total violations, the liquidity trend variable was significant (p<0.01) and had 
a standardized Beta of .430 without the dummy variables; the effect diminished in the 
model with the dummy variables as seen in Table 12 (p. 61).  Similarly, for egregious 
violations, the standardized beta for the liquidity trend variable was .558 without the 
dummy variables; this decreased to .370 in the model with the dummy variables.  This 
attenuation of the effect of the liquidity trend variable with the addition of the industry 
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 dummy variables provides some support for the second hypothesis.  This support is 
tempered, though, by the fact the efficiency variable is also significant in most of the 
models, and the effect of efficiency actually increases each time the dummy variables are 
added.  This same increase in magnitude occurs for the efficiency trend variable in the 
egregious violations model.  Thus, this analysis shows stronger support for hypothesis 
two than previous analyses, but the support is mixed.  The industry dummy variables for 
steel and oil were significant, although the magnitude of the effects were also lower than 
in prior analyses.  Firms in the oil industry commit fewer total (p<0.05) and serious 
(p<0.1) violations than firms in the paper industry, and the later significance tests showed 
that firms in the oil industry also committed fewer total violations than firms in the pulp 
industry (p<0.1).  While pulp is not significant in any of the models, subsequent 
significance tests revealed that firms in the pulp industry commit significantly more total 
violations than firms in the steel (p<0.1) and oil (p<0.1) industries and significantly more 
other violations than firms in the steel industry (p<0.1).  In support of the final 
hypothesis, prior violations are positively and significantly related to total violations 
(p<0.1) and egregious violations (p<0.05).  Size is negatively and positively related to 
total (p<0.05) and egregious (p<0.01) violations while number of facilities is significantly 
and positively related to egregious violations (p<0.05).  Both size (B=.790) and number 
of facilities (B=5.843) exert a large effect on egregious violations.  Interestingly, union 
membership is positively related to all violation types and significantly related to 
egregious violations (p<0.05), and the magnitude of this effect on egregious violations is 
large (.583). 
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 As mentioned for the first four-year period, the results from these models should 
be considered exploratory and interpreted with that in mind due to the small sample size.  
That said, the results for the final four years of data differed from the results of the earlier 
analyses.  These models provide more support for the hypotheses.  The results showed 
stronger support for a profit-squeeze argument at the firm level, although it is still mixed.  
These data also provided some support for the second hypothesis, which was not 
supported by earlier analyses.  The third hypothesis also received support in these 
models.  The relationship between violations and some of the control variables are in line 
with earlier analyses.18
                                                 
18 I again reran the regressions using Keane’s (1993) measure of profitability.  For total violations, the 
profitability trend variable gains significance and is positively related to violations.  For egregious 
violations, the liquidity trend variable loses its significance.  These changes add to the mixed support for 
hypothesis one in these models.  For other violations, the priors variable gains significance, providing 
added support for hypothesis three.     
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 Chapter V – Discussion and Conclusion 
 Overall, this research provided mixed support for a profit-squeeze and crime 
argument at the firm level.  Aggregate analyses of all years and the separate analyses of 
the two four-year periods found that more efficient firms are more likely to commit 
violations.  This finding is not consistent with a profit-squeeze and crime argument, but it 
does replicate findings by others who report that moderate to good financial performance 
is related to illegal behavior (Hill et al., 1992, Baucus & Near, 1991).  In this analysis, 
though, the result could be a spurious one due to the efficiency measure.  Efficiency 
indicates the sales generating ability of firm assets, but it is largely determined by the 
nature of production in different industries (Clinard & Yeager, 1980).  In other words, 
certain industries strive for greater efficiency more than others.  Thus, efficiency is highly 
correlated with the nature of certain industries.  For this reason, Clinard and Yeager 
(1980) dropped efficiency from their final analysis.  As seen in the bivariate results, 
efficiency was highly correlated with the dummy for the oil industry.  Thus, the finding 
that more efficient firms are more likely to commit violations could be spurious.  
The financial performance trend variables showed stronger support for the profit-
squeeze argument.  Profit-squeeze was related to violations in the analyses of the two 
four-year periods.  This suggests that criminal outcomes do not result from long-term 
patterns of financial improvement or decline, but short-term patterns affect choices to 
commit illegal acts.  The liquidity trend variable was negative and significant for other 
violations in the analysis for the years 1993-1996, and it was negative and significant for 
all violation types in the analysis for the years 1997-2000.  Liquidity measures whether a 
firm is experiencing consistent operating losses; in this case, the data show that firms 
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 experiencing operating growth commit fewer violations.  Similarly, the efficiency trend 
was negative and significant for egregious violations in the analysis for the years 1997-
2000.  Clinard and Yeager (1980) note that while average efficiency is determined in 
large part by the nature of the industry, improved efficiency is desired by all industries, 
and is therefore, not tied to specific industries.  This finding, then, is less suspicious than 
the findings regarding efficiency discussed above, and is more support for the profit-
squeeze argument.   
Support for a profit-squeeze argument is tempered, however, by the finding that 
firms with increasing profits committed more egregious OSHA violations between 1997-
2000.  According to Clinard & Yeager (1980), the profitability ratio is “frequently used 
as the ultimate test of management effectiveness” (p. 128); it basically shows how well 
managers are using assets to produce income.  There are several ways of interpreting this 
finding.  First, this finding could be a data artifact; it could be the result of some third 
variable not included in the analysis.  Alternately, it could be that profits cause managers 
to become careless so that they pay less attention to regulatory details.  Once managers 
are improving profits and experiencing success, they may feel they can disregard even the 
most serious regulations.  Or, since I am unable to determine the causal order of this 
relationship, it could be that managers are creating improved profitability by violating 
egregious OSHA regulations.  The more serious OSHA violations can include willfully 
choosing not to update dangerous and costly machinery.  Therefore, by violating the most 
serious OSHA violations, managers can produce more savings, and hence, more income.  
Further, the fines for these violations, while larger than for less serious violations, are 
typically not high enough to outweigh the benefits.  Thus, managers rationally weighing 
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 the costs and benefits of egregious OSHA violations, may choose to violate regulations to 
continually improve profitability.  This finding should be further investigated in a 
longitudinal analysis that could determine causal ordering. 
  Following Simpson (1986), I analyzed whether profit-squeeze at the firm and 
industry levels was related not only to more violations, but also to more serious violations 
of OSHA.  Simpson (1986) found that firms with declining profits committed more 
serious anti-competitive behaviors.  I hypothesized a similar relationship between profit-
squeeze and OSHA violations because more serious OSHA violations can produce larger 
savings, which would be desirable during times of financial stress.  Thus, I explored the 
profit-squeeze argument using four models, one for total violations, one for egregious 
violations, one for serious violations, and one for all other violations.  In general, there 
was not a great deal of support for the profit-squeeze argument, including for more 
serious violations when I analyzed the data over the eight-year period.  However, there is 
some evidence that economic performance may affect offending for shorter time periods 
(1997-2000), but these results are not replicated for the earlier block of time (1993-1996). 
 I also did not find reliable support for my second hypothesis that controlling for 
industry would attenuate firm-level economic effects.  In the analysis for years 1997-
2000 the liquidity trend variables were significant in the initial analysis without the 
dummy variables, and the magnitude of the effects did diminish for all violation types.  
However, the efficiency variable was in the opposite direction as predicted, and the 
impact of these variables actually increased upon adding the industry dummy variables to 
the analysis.  Further, in the analysis of the full models and the analysis for years 1993-
1996, the financial performance variables were not significant and the magnitudes of the 
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 variables were not consistently attenuated.  Thus, the support for the second hypothesis is 
not strong.  Interestingly, though, the industry dummy variables were consistently 
significant and exerted the largest impact on violations.  This suggests definite industry 
effects.  Unfortunately due to analytical constraints, I was unable to explore which 
industry characteristics were affected violations.  Drawing from the industry overview 
section above, the oil industry was the strongest economic performer during this time 
period with continually increasing profits. Results tended to show that firms in the oil 
industry committed fewer violations than firms in the pulp and paper industries.  These 
tentative data should be followed with more rigorous tests in the future.   
Another interesting finding at the industry level was that firms in the paper 
industry were much more likely to commit violations, especially serious and other 
violations, than firms in the other three industries.  This could be a result of OSHA 
inspectors targeting the paper industry more heavily than the other industries, but this 
does not seem likely since the steel industry had the highest average rate of injuries and 
illnesses (5.25 compared to paper at 1.61) and it is known as a particularly hazardous 
injury.  It might be, then, that the paper industry is actually more criminogenic than the 
other three industries.  This should be explored more carefully in future research. 
One of the contributions of this study was to control for prior violations in the 
analysis.  I expected that firms with prior violations would commit more and more 
serious violations.  Results did not indicate strong support for this hypothesis.  This is 
surprising given the strong support for the hypothesis in the criminological literature 
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2001, Agnew, 1991, Baucus & 
Near, 1991, Sutherland, 1983).  My inability to find support for this hypothesis could be 
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 due to the way I measured prior violations.  In their study, Baucus & Near (1991) 
measured prior violations using three dummy variables, one for one or more violations, 
one for two or more violations, and one for three or more violations.  They found that the 
dummy variable for three or more violations was the best predictor of future violations 
(Baucus & Near, 1991).  Perhaps using a different measure would have produced 
different results.  Another reason for the lack of support could be due to the truncation of 
the prior violation data.  The prior violation data in this study only span the three years 
leading up to the study period.  Gathering prior violations for a longer time period also 
may have produced different results. 
 Another contribution of this study was the inclusion of a control for OSHA 
enforcement behavior.  Union membership was included in the analyses and was 
significantly associated with violations.  The direction of the association, however, 
tended to change throughout the analyses.  In the full models, union membership was 
related to fewer violations of OSHA, although these findings were generally not 
significant.  In the analysis for the years 1993-1996, union membership was negatively 
and significantly related to serious and other violations, but in the analysis for the last 
four years, union membership was positively and significantly associated with more 
egregious violations.  This changing direction of influence may be a data artifact, or it 
could be that union membership has a different influence on illegal behavior at different 
times.  The strength of unions fluctuates over time as do the issues that concern union 
leaders and members.  Perhaps from 1993-1996 unionized firms were safer work 
environments because unions were stronger and able to influence managers on safety 
issues, and OSHA inspectors targeted nonunion firms more to impose costs on nonunion 
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 firms that were competing with union firms.  But then in the last four years unions lost 
their strength to influence managers on safety issues, causing union firms to become less 
safe and increasing the safety complaints by union employees.  While these results are 
not clear on the direction of the influence unions have on OSHA violations, they suggest 
that studies investigating the profit-squeeze and crime relationship using OSHA 
violations should pay attention to the role played by unionization in this relationship.   
 Another interesting finding in this analysis was the difference in the findings 
between the two four-year periods.  The most relevant difference to this study is the 
stronger support for a profit-squeeze argument that can be found in the analysis of the last 
four years.  Rather than picking up some difference in firm behavior between the two 
periods, I could be finding an OSHA enforcement effect.  According to Siskind (2002), 
OSHA inspections were at the lowest in 1995 and 1996 due to threatened budget cuts and 
the reorganization of OSHA evaluation procedures.  Thus, it is possible that differences 
in OSHA inspection behavior are causing the difference.  There are no other obvious 
events that could be driving the difference in OSHA inspection behavior.  However, it 
also could be, as mentioned previously, that companies experience short-term trends of 
financial improvement and decline that influence decisions to commit illegal acts.  These 
data show fewer trends in the first four years than in the last four so it may be that firms 
were simply not experiencing general trends of growth or decline in the first four-year 
period.  Future research should increase the sample period to see if these short-term 
patterns continue.   
  There were four major limitations to this study.  First, the data were not collected 
specifically for this study; thus, the industries were more similar regarding key 
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 characteristics than would have been ideal.  The industries were very similar in 
concentration and appeared to be subject to similar OSHA regulations.  Future research 
should replicate this study using more diverse industries in order to more accurately test 
the effect of industry characteristics on illegal corporate actions.  Second, in this analysis, 
I averaged the eight-years of data, which resulted in the loss of the industry measures of 
profitability, concentration, and injuries and illnesses.  Because I was only examining 
firms in four industries, averaging the data greatly reduced the variation in the industry 
measures.  This prevented me from further exploring the industry effects and forced me 
to rely on dummy variables for industry membership.  The third and perhaps greatest 
limitation of this study was the sample size.  The small sample size limited my ability to 
include all the variables of interest in the full models, and even excluding the financial 
performance trend variables, I still included 12 variables in the analysis with only 72 
cases.  This likely created quite a few zero cells, thus reducing the power of my findings.  
Finally, because I analyzed the data using cross-sectional analysis rather than longitudinal 
analysis, my ability to address the causal order of the variables was restricted.  Thus, it is 
not possible to conclude that declining or unstable financial performance causes firms to 
commit more OSHA violations.  It could be that offenders suffer economic losses as a 
result of illegal activity. While this does not seem likely because OSHA penalties are 
typically minor and not large enough to cause serious financial strain, firms may suffer 
reputational damage that can ultimately affect economic prospects.  Causal order should 
be addressed in future studies of the profit-squeeze and crime argument.    
With these limitations in mind, this study found mixed support for a profit-
squeeze argument at the firm level.  However, the study did produce several notable 
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 findings.  First, short-term patterns of financial improvement or decline had a greater 
effect on violations of OSHA regulations.  Firms with increasing liquidity committed 
fewer other violations in the years 1993-1996 and fewer total, egregious, serious, and 
other violations in the years 1997-2000.  An increase in efficiency was related to fewer 
egregious violations in the years 1997-2000.  Another interesting finding was that union 
membership was related to OSHA violations, although the direction of influence changed 
between the two four-year periods, with unionized firms committing fewer serious and 
other violations in the first four years and more egregious violations in the final four-year 
period.  Given the influence that unions exert on OSHA enforcement behavior, future 
researchers should pay more attention to the possible link between unionization and 
OSHA violations.  Are unionized firms subject to less scrutiny from authorities during 
certain time periods?  Are union firms better policed internally?  More research is needed 
to unravel this potentially important relationship. 
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